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CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM REHNQUIST: HIS LAW-AND-
ORDER LEGACY AND IMPACT ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
Madhavi M. McCall* and Michael A. McCall** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With the death of Chief Justice William Rehnquist on September 3, 
2005, an important chapter closed in American constitutional law.  
Although the retirement of Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
announced early in the summer of 2005 ensured that the 2005-2006 U.S. 
Supreme Court Term would differ from those before, the loss of the 
Chief and the close of the Rehnquist Court further distinguishes this time 
as an end of an era.1 
Given his 19-year tenure as Chief Justice and 33-year career on the 
Court, Justice Rehnquist left a profound mark on the Court and on 
American politics more generally.  In the months and years ahead, 
scholars inevitably will employ various perspectives from which to 
assess Rehnquist’s legacy.  Some likely will focus on his affable style 
and skills as a social leader on the Court;2 others may examine his 
curious place in history as having presided over the impeachment of one 
President3  while having helped another get elected by voting to halt a 
 
*  Associate Professor of Political Science, San Diego State University. B.A., 1989, Case Western 
Reserve University; M.A., 1993, University of Akron; Ph.D., 1999, Washington University, St. 
Louis. 
**  Assistant Professor of Sociology, San Diego State University. B.A., 1989, University of Akron; 
M.A., 1993, University of Akron; Ph.D., 2004, Washington University, St. Louis. 
1.  We recognize the dangers of depicting any Court, including the Rehnquist Court, as a 
single, coherent era.  See, e.g., Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Lee Epstein, The ‘Rehnquist’ 
Court (?), 15 LAW AND COURTS 18 (2005).  Indeed, changes over time are of considerable 
importance in various places in this study. 
2.   See, e.g., David G. Savage, Former Rehnquist Clerks Recall His Wit, Warmth, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 7, 2005, at A13. 
 3. LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING 
AMERICA: INSTITUTIONAL POWERS AND CONSTRAINTS 644 (5th ed. 2004) (“Rehnquist’s research 
and writing on federal impeachments proved propitious when he was called upon to preside over the 
1
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recount of Florida ballots;4 and almost assuredly others will analyze the 
impact of the Chief Justice in ways that perhaps are not yet fully 
conceptualized.  Whether these influences are cast as positive or 
negative will continue, of course, to be the subject of much debate and 
may, at times, depend to a considerable degree on one’s political views.  
What is beyond most debates, however, is that Chief Justice Rehnquist 
was a staunch conservative who cast votes and marshaled majorities for 
decisions that reduced constitutional protections for the criminally 
accused, rolled back federal powers, and streamlined federal appeals.5  It 
seems an appropriate time to carefully and systematically analyze his 
influence in such areas. 
In terms of criminal justice issues, many undoubtedly will assess 
Rehnquist’s tenure as a pendulum swing away from the more liberal 
rulings of the Warren Court.6  Such evaluations might characterize 
Rehnquist, and perhaps the Court more generally, as reflecting a broader 
political movement toward a “law and order” or social control posture.7  
This study is designed, in part, to measure the accuracy of such a 
portrayal of Justice Rehnquist and to present some of the issue areas that 
might prove particularly fruitful and appropriate for this type of 
evaluation. 
Regardless of the analytic approach, it would be unwise to assume 
that Rehnquist’s effect was without limit.  Ironically, and perhaps in part 
a result of his battle with thyroid cancer at least in the last term, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s influence may have weakened substantially near the 
end of his career.  For instance, long time Court watcher Linda 
Greenhouse has described the 2003-2004 Supreme Court Term as the 
year that Chief Justice Rehnquist “may have lost his court.”8  Indeed, in 
the 2003-2004 Term, Chief Justice Rehnquist was in the minority in a 
 
1999 Senate impeachment trial of President Bill Clinton.”). 
 4. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  The Court 
decided this controversial case 5-to-4. Id. 
 5. On rights of the accused, see EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3; on federalism, see 
EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3; on habeas corpus petitions, see VICTOR E. FLANGO, HABEAS 
CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (1994). 
 6. For a quantitative summary of changes in decisions supporting the accused after the 
Warren Court, see LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD SPAETH & THOMAS G. WALKER, THE 
SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 166-68 (1994). 
 7. On the classic distinction and tension between the crime control/social order model and 
the due process model of criminal justice (which are often held as reflecting the varying tendencies 
in the Warren and Rehnquist Courts), see HERBERT S. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
SANCTION (1968). 
 8. Linda Greenhouse, The Year Rehnquist May Have Lost His Court. N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 
2004, at A1. 
2
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variety of high profile cases and his inability to muster a majority for 
these cases in part prompted Greenhouse’s comments.  Greenhouse 
notes, for instance, that Rehnquist was unable to persuade a majority of 
the other members that the President’s conduct during the war on 
terrorism was constitutionally protected.9  Moreover, while Chief Justice 
Rehnquist in prior terms repeatedly found his state’s rights position 
garnering a majority ruling in federalism cases, in more recent years 
,Justice O’Connor at times has voted against the Chief Justice.10  The 
2003-2004 Term aside, Chief Justice Rehnquist was on the losing side in 
some of the most controversial decisions of late including Lawrence v. 
Texas,11 granting sexual rights to same-sex couples, Atkins v. Virginia,12 
stating that the execution of mentally retarded individuals constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment, Grutter v. Bollinger,13 upholding a 
continued need for affirmative action, Roper v. Simmons,14 finding that 
the execution of individuals who commit capital offenses under the age 
of 18 years constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, and Rompilla v. 
Beard,15 holding for only the third time in 20 years that a capital 
defendant had received constitutionally deficient assistance of counsel. 
Although Rehnquist found himself in the minority in some high 
profile recent cases, his general federalism revolution and determination 
to garner additional power for the federal courts have been relatively 
successful.16  That is, while Rehnquist’s influence on the Court may 
have declined in recent years, a broader review of cases from his tenure 
spanning more than thirty years provides a more accurate picture of his 
impact as both an Associate and Chief Justice. 
In this article, we explore Chief Justice Rehnquist’s criminal justice 
decisions through an empirical analysis of the Court’s decision-making 
tendencies for the most recent natural court and a review of selected 
criminal justice decisions written by Justice Rehnquist throughout his 
career.  To start, we limit the analysis, with only two exceptions, to 
decisions actually written by Justice Rehnquist.  Although Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, in that position, had an important role in leading other 
 
 9. E.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); 
and Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 10. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
 11. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 12. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 13. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 14. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 15. See Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S.Ct. 2456 (2005). 
 16. See Linda Greenhouse, The Last Days of the Rehnquist Court: The Rewards of Patience 
and Power, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 251 (2003). 
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justices to agree with him by assigning cases, we gleaned a substantial 
amount of information regarding his decisional patterns and policy 
preferences by analyzing the opinions he personally authored. The focus 
of this inquiry, then, is Justice Rehnquist’s actual opinions and not his 
votes in other cases.  This empirical analysis is complemented and given 
context by a discussion of the overall thrust of criminal justice cases 
decided by the Court in the last decade. 
A preliminary search of the Lexis/Nexis database indicates that 
over his career, Justice Rehnquist wrote more than 250 decisions17 
 
 17. A Lexis/Nexis search originally produced a list of over 250 cases.  We found that a 
criminal justice issue was not central to some of the generated cases.  In order to conduct this 
analysis, we first read each case and determined which cases were principally related to a criminal 
justice issue.  While ultimately we did not include a specific discussion of many of the remaining 
cases, we nevertheless created an initial list of criminal justice cases written by Justice Rehnquist 
and used these cases in forming assessments and identifying the patterns suggested in this paper.  
That list is: Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel, 406 
U.S. 742 (1972); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); 
Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); Tollett v. 
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Cupp v. Naughten, 
414 U.S.  141 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); United States v. Maze, 414 
U.S. 395 (1974); California Bankers v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 430 (1974); Gooding v. United States, 416 
U.S. 430 (1974); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S.  637 (1974); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 
433 (1974); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974); 
United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975), overruled by United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 
(1978); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); Middendorf  v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976); 
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977); 
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433  U.S. 119 
(1977); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978); 
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Scott v. Illinois, 
440 U.S. 367 (1979); Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 
(1979); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980); United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 
(1980); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); United 
States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 242 (1980); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981); Parratt v. 
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Oregon v. 
Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982); United States v. Valenzuela-bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982); Hewill v. 
Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), overruled by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); United States v. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); United States v. Villamonte-
Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984); United States v. Rodgers, 466 
U.S. 475 (1984); United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 
(1984); Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); 
Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317 (1984); United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984); 
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); Ponte v. 
Real, 471 U.S. 491 (1985); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985); Garrett v. United States, 
471 U.S. 773 (1985); United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); Hill v. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 
U.S. 327 (1986); United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 
673 (1986); New York v. P.J. Video, 475 U.S. 868 (1986); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 
(1986); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986); 
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); California v. 
4
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dealing with criminal justices issues.  In order to provide some 
meaningful analysis, we examine only cases that deal with the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection against illegal search and seizure, the Fifth 
Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination, federalism as related 
to criminal justice issues, and federal habeas corpus.18  Following this 
 
Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 
481 U.S. 551 (1987); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 
U.S. 171 (1987); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988); Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 
(1988); United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25 (1988); Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 
(1988); Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988); Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988); 
Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988); Lockhard v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988); Arizona v. 
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); Graham v. Connor, 
490 U.S. 386 (1989); Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 
(1989); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 
U.S. 259 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 
(1990); Boyde v. California, 494  U.S. 370 (1990); Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 110 (1990); Whitmore 
v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990); Florida v. Jimeno, 
500 U.S. 248 (1991); Mu’Mi v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 
(1991); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992); Dawson v. 
Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992); United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378 (1992); United States v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992); Herrera v. Collins, 
506 U.S. 390 (1993); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 
619 (1993); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333 (1993); Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993); 
Nat’l Org. For Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994); Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 
(1994); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994); Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994); 
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Reno v. Koray, 
515 U.S. 50 (1995); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 
(1996); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152 (1996); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996); Ohio v. 
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997); United States v. 
Hyde, 520 U.S. 670 (1997); McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997); Bracy v. Gramley, 
520 U.S. 899 (1997); Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 (1998); United States v. Ramirez, 523 
U.S. 65 (1998); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998); Bousley v. United States, 523 
U.S. 614 (1998); Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740 (1998); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 
(1998); Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Neder v. 
United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000); Weeks v. Angelone, 528 
U.S. 225 (2000); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000); Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753 
(2000); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001); 
Florida v. Thomas, 532 U.S. 774 (2001); Corr. Servs. Corps v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001); United 
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001); Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161 (2002); United 
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002); Scheidler v. NOW, 537 
U.S. 393 (2003); Conn. Dept of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003); Demore v. Hyung Joon 
Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003); Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634 (2003); Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 
366 (2003); United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004); Thornton v. United States, 541 
U.S. 615 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005); 
Arthur Anderson v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 2129 (2005); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004); 
Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125 (2004); and Pace v. Diguglielmo, 125 S.Ct. 1807 (2005). 
 18. Although not detailed in this examination, Rehnquist also wrote a number of interesting 
double jeopardy and prisoner’s rights opinions.  Consistent with his conservative leanings, most of 
these cases were decided in a conservative manner.  Indeed, we did not locate a single prisoner’s 
rights case in which Rehnquist handed down a liberal decision. 
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introduction, in Section II we provide a brief biographical sketch of 
Justice Rehnquist’s education and career.  We then analyze the criminal 
justice decisions of the most recent Rehnquist Court using cases from 
1995-2005 in Section III.  This time frame captures Rehnquist’s last 
natural court19 with the exception of the first term.  Although Justice 
Breyer–the last member to join the Court of interest here–served a full 
term in 1994, we do not include the 1994-1995 Term to avoid the risk 
that Breyer’s performance (and the Court’s more general decision 
patterns) might have been distorted by the “freshman effect.”20  In 
Section IV we extend the period under review and examine some of 
Justice Rehnquist’s written opinions, both as an Associate Justice and as 
Chief Justice.  In the final section, we discuss the overall impact of 
Justice Rehnquist’s decisions on criminal justice issues and revisit the 
characterization of Rehnquist as central to a “law and order” shift. 
II.  BIOGRAPHY 
Originally appointed by President Nixon in 1971 to replace Justice 
John Harlan, Chief Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist served longer than 
any other member of the current Court.21  Born in a suburb of 
Milwaukee in 1924, Rehnquist was raised in Wisconsin and stayed there 
until completing high school.22  After high school, Rehnquist entered 
Kenyon College in Ohio23 for his Bachelor’s Degree, but World War II 
interrupted his college years.24  He joined the Army Air Corps and later 
 
 19. EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3, at 689 (“The term natural court refers to a period of 
time during which the membership of the Court remains stable.”).  There were six natural courts 
(identified as Rehnquist 1 through Rehnquist 6) under Chief Rehnquist.  Id.  These are: the Court as 
of September 26, 1986 when Rehnquist took the oath to be Chief Justice (Justices Rehnquist, 
Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, O’Connor, and Scalia), Rehnquist 2 
(Kennedy replacing Powell), Rehnquist 3 (Souter replacing Brennan), Rehnquist 4 (Thomas 
replacing Marshall), Rehnquist 5 (Ginsburg replacing White), and Rehnquist 6 (Breyer replacing 
Blackmun).  EPSTEIN, SEGAL, SPAETH & WALKER, supra note 6. 
 20. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Christopher E. Smith, The Rehnquist Court and 
Criminal Justice: An Empirical Assessment, 19 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 161 (2003). 
 21. Of current members, Justice Stevens has served the longest; Stevens came onto the Court 
nearly four years after Rehnquist.  EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3.  Justice Powell took his oath 
to sit on the High Court the same day as Rehnquist (January 7, 1972).  Id.  Powell retired 18 years 
before Rehnquist’s death.  Id. 
 22. CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, MADHAVI MCCALL & CYNTHIA PEREZ MCCLUSKEY, LAW AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: EMERGING ISSUES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 12 (2005). 
 23. Perhaps surprisingly, this small Ohio college also helped shape the minds of two other 
Supreme Court justices, David Davis and Stanley Matthews.  Both served on the Court during the 
latter half of the 19th century.  See EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3, at 678-83. 
 24. SMITH,  MCCALL & MCCLUSKEY  2005, supra note 22, at 12. 
6
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used his GI bill to enter Stanford University to complete his Bachelors.25  
Upon finishing his BA, Rehnquist earned masters degrees at both 
Harvard University and Stanford University before enrolling in Stanford 
Law School where he graduated first in his class in 1952 at the age of 
twenty-seven.26  With an impressive law school career behind him, 
Rehnquist garnered a prestigious clerkship for United States Supreme 
Court Justice Robert Jackson.27  Rehnquist’s preference for conservative 
rulings during his time with Justice Jackson is quite clear.  At one point, 
in a memo to Justice Jackson regarding the Supreme Court’s pending 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education,28 Rehnquist argued that the 
Court’s doctrine of “separate but equal” as articulated in the infamous 
case of Plessey v. Ferguson29 should be upheld.30  It is a controversial 
position,31 but illuminates Rehnquist’s beliefs on the role of government, 
and potentially his opposition32 to certain liberal ideals.  Indeed, as one 
author notes,33 a few years after Rehnquist finished his clerkship, he 
wrote an article for the U.S. News and World Report complaining that 
Supreme Court clerks were predominantly liberal.  This, according to 
Rehnquist, often resulted in rulings that showed “extreme solitude for 
the claims of Communists and other criminal defendants, expansion of 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id.  The achievement is particularly impressive in that Rehnquist was a Stanford graduate 
and the “coveted clerkships at the Supreme Court were then the province of the Ivy League law 
schools.” David G. Savage, Chief Justice, 80, Led Court on a Conservative Path, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 
4, 2005, at A21.  Moreover, of the nine justices on the Court when Rehnquist joined, he was the 
only one from a West coast law school.  See EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3, at 678-83.  All the 
others were from Ivy League and/or eastern schools except for Chief Justice Burger, who was from 
the University of Minnesota.  Id.  After Rehnquist’s death, Professor Richard Epstein reflected that 
Rehnquist “was innately suspicious of the Ivy League mode of analysis that so often drives modern 
constitutional scholarship.” Richard Epstein, Sidebars on Rehnquist and Roberts, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 
11, 2005, at M3. 
 28. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 29. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 
347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 30. The memo became public during Rehnquist’s first confirmation hearing. Greenhouse, 
supra note 16, at n. 41. 
 31. Id. at 257-58. 
 32. Before his confirmation, Rehnquist informed the Senate that he wrote the memo from 
what he perceived to be Justice Jackson’s point of view.  For a brief discussion of this and other 
allegations then facing Rehnquist, see Adam Liptak, The Memo That Rehnquist Wrote and Had to 
Disown, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at 5.  Interesting parallels exist with the confirmation hearings 
of John Roberts, Rehnquist’s successor.  Roberts too felt obliged to state that arguments he made in 
memos and elsewhere reflected the opinions of the administration he represented rather than his 
own.  See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, By Invoking a Former Justice, the Nominee Says Much But 
Gives Away Little, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at 24. 
 33. Greenhouse, supra note 16, at 257-58. 
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federal power at the expense of State power, and great sympathy toward 
any government regulation of business.”34 After completion of his 
prestigious position as a Supreme Court clerk, Rehnquist went into 
private practice in Phoenix, Arizona.35 
While working in the private sector, Rehnquist became involved in 
local politics and, specifically, in the workings of the Republican Party.36  
Rehnquist’s role in the political party expanded just as the message of 
“law and order” began to emerge as a major theme in national 
elections.37  In 1964, Rehnquist served as a legal advisor to the then 
ultra-conservative Arizona Senator and Republican presidential 
nominee, Barry Goldwater.38  Prompted by urban rioting and other social 
unrest, and finding himself far behind Lyndon Johnson in the polls, 
Goldwater began to focus on a social order message that tapped the 
concerns of many regarding crime and an expanding federal 
government.39 
Although Goldwater lost by one of the largest electoral margins in 
presidential history,40 the “law and order” theme would continue as a 
major electoral strategy.  In 1968, and again in 1972, Nixon trumpeted 
the need for crime control, the restoration of order, and changes in 
policies that he saw as handcuffing the police and coddling prisoners.41  
Nixon was especially critical of the judiciary, noting, “Some of our 
courts in their decisions have gone too far in weakening the peace forces 
as against the criminal forces.”42 
Nixon culled Goldwater’s earlier campaign staff and, after the 
 
 34. Originally located in William H. Rehnquist, Who Writes Decisions of the Supreme Court, 
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Dec. 13, 1957, at 74-75. 
 35. SMITH,  MCCALL &  MCCLUSKEY  2005, supra note 22, at 12. 
 36. Id. 
 37. On the emergence of the “law and order” theme, see Michael McCall, Policing Levels and 
Law and Order (2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington University in St. Louis) (on file 
with Author); see generally ERIKA FAIRCHILD & VINCENT WEBB, THE POLITICS OF CRIME AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1985). 
 38. SMITH,  MCCALL &  MCCLUSKEY  2005, supra note 22, at 12. 
 39. See LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS (1983); SMITH,  MCCALL &  
MCCLUSKEY  2005, supra note 22, at 43-53; THEODORE WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 
1964 (1965).  Interestingly, in this position of campaign advisor, Rehnquist revealed another 
tendency that would come to characterize his tenure on the Court–giving primacy to states’ rights.  
Rehnquist “urged Goldwater to oppose the landmark civil rights bill before Congress, saying it 
marked an unwise expansion of federal authority over local matters.” Savage, supra note 27, at A21. 
 40. SMITH,  MCCALL &  MCCLUSKEY  2005, supra note 22, at 97. 
 41. MCCALL 2004, supra note 37, at 54-58. 
 42. Richard M. Nixon, 1968 Presidential Nominee Acceptance Speech, Republican 
Convention, Miami Beach, transcribed into pamphlet by the Nixon-Agnew Campaign Committee 
(Aug. 8, 1968). 
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election, appointed Rehnquist to serve as an Assistant Attorney General, 
placing him in charge of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal 
Counsel–the constitutional law arm of the Justice Department.43  As a 
member of the Justice Department, Rehnquist was often called upon to 
defend the Nixon Administration in court.44  During these years 
Rehnquist, like Nixon, was very vocal in his criticism of the Warren 
Court’s liberal decisions, arguing that the Warren Court had overstepped 
its bounds and had engaged in judicial activism beyond constitutional 
mandate.45  Rehnquist’s work for the Justice Department and his support 
of conservative philosophies eventually led to his nomination by 
President Nixon to the High Court in 1971.46  As Nixon’s fourth and 
final Supreme Court appointment,47  Rehnquist was also considered “the 
one who best lived up to Nixon’s pledge to name “law and order” 
conservatives to the bench.”48  The Senate confirmed Rehnquist in a 68-
26 vote as the 100th jurist to sit on the U.S. Supreme Court.49 
When Justice Warren Burger retired in 1986 from the Chief Justice 
position, President Ronald Reagan nominated Rehnquist to the position 
of Chief.50  The proposed elevation forced another Senate confirmation, 
and although Rehnquist was confirmed, his Senate confirmation vote 
was the closest in American history for an individual nominated to the 
position of Chief Justice.51  Civil rights and civil liberties groups heavily 
opposed Rehnquist.52  President Reagan submitted Rehnquist’s 
nomination for the Chief Justice position simultaneously with that of 
Justice Antonin Scalia for the Associate Justice position.53  The timing 
of the two nominations proved advantageous for President Reagan.  
Rehnquist’s controversial nomination for Chief Justice took so much of 
 
 43. SMITH,  MCCALL &  MCCLUSKEY  2005, supra note 22, at 12. 
 44. Id. 
 45. While it is beyond the scope of this inquiry to determine how Rehnquist came to form his 
viewpoints, it is clear that throughout his career as a lawyer and as a member of the Republican 
Party he tended to hold strongly conservative convictions.  See generally Greenhouse, supra note 
16. 
 46. SMITH,  MCCALL &  MCCLUSKEY  2005, supra note 22, at 12. 
 47. Justices Burger, Blackmun, and Powell were also appointed by Nixon.  See EPSTEIN & 
WALKER, supra note 3, at 678-83. 
 48. Savage, supra note 27, at A20. 
 49. The number of justices to this point is calculated from data in Epstein & Walker, supra 
note 3, at 678-83, and Savage, supra note 27. 
 50. SMITH,  MCCALL &  MCCLUSKEY  2005, supra note 22, at 12. 
 51. Rehnquist was confirmed as Chief Justice by a 65-33 vote.  EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra 
note 3, at 681. 
 52. See id. at 678-83; MCCALL 2005, supra note 22, at 12. 
 53. SMITH,  MCCALL &  MCCLUSKEY  2005, supra note 22, at 14. 
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the Senate’s time that it made Scalia’s confirmation hearings relatively 
quick and smooth.  Consequently, Reagan was able to elevate Rehnquist 
with some difficulty, but also was able to place the extremely 
conservative Justice Scalia on the Court against surprisingly limited 
objections.54 
III.  DECISION TRENDS ON THE REHNQUIST COURT, 1995-2005 
A member of the High Court since 1971, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
sat on the Court longer than almost any other member in history55 and 
served as Chief Justice longer than anyone in about a century.56  His 
lengthy tenure allowed him to see the Court’s majority adopt many of 
his preferences limiting the Warren Court’s decisions. 
To evaluate and make meaningful generalizations regarding the 
decision-making tendencies of the most recent natural court, we present 
in this section, an empirical analysis of criminal justice cases decided by 
the Rehnquist Court during the 1995-2005 Terms.  We use the label 
“liberal” to describe a philosophy that favors expanding rights for 
individuals in a criminal justice context and “conservative” to describe 
decisions in criminal justice that tend to prefer the government’s position 
related to prosecuting and punishing offenders over the recognition 
and/or expansion of individual rights for the criminally accused.57  Since 
Rehnquist’s appointment to the Chief position in 1986, the Court 
consistently has been labeled a conservative court, and it held generally 
that most of the Rehnquist Court justices are conservative and rule for 
 
 54. See, e.g., accounts available at http://www.oyez.org (Scalia Biography) and www.pbs.org 
(Newshour, Supreme Court Watch, Scalia). 
 55. William Douglas served longer (36 years, 7 months) than any other Justice in history.  See 
EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3, at 678-83.  Other leaders in this category include, in order of 
length of service, Stephen Field (34 years, 7 months), John Marshall (34 years, 5 months), Hugo 
Black (34 years, 1 month), John Harlan I (33 years, 10 months), William Brennan (33 years, 9 
months), and William Rehnquist (33 years, 8 months).  Id.  Brennan’s actual service was slightly 
longer than indicated because he received a recess appointment. 
 56. At 19 years, the Rehnquist Court (1986-2005) is the fourth longest in Supreme Court 
history.  The longest tenures of a Chief Justice are John Marshall (1801-1835), Roger Taney (1836-
1864), and Melville Fuller (1888-1910).  See EPSTEIN, SEGAL, SPAETH & WALKER, supra note 6, at 
Table 5-2. 
 57. Here, we use the definitions advanced in the Supreme Court Judicial Database in which 
“[l]iberal decisions in the area of civil liberties are pro-person accused or convicted of a crime, pro-
civil liberties or civil rights claimant, pro-indigent, pro-[Native American], and anti-government in 
due process and privacy.” Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Decisional Trends on the Warren 
and Burger Courts: Results from the Supreme Court Data Base Project, 73 JUDICATURE 103, 103 
(1989). 
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law enforcement on criminal justice issues.58  Unlike the earlier liberal 
decisions of the Warren Court, the Rehnquist Court has been “active in 
narrowing or overturning many Warren and Burger Court precedents 
that were favorable to the rights” of the criminally accused.59  Here, we 
conduct only a broad analysis of the Court’s decisional tendencies.60  
The examination confirms that the Court indeed rendered conservative 
decisions in a wide-range of criminal justice issues,61 although we note 
that liberal decisions are also evident.62 
First, we found that a large portion of the Court’s docket concerned 
issues related to the criminal justice system.  Generally, for the time 
frame of this analysis, thirty to forty percent of the Court’s full decisions 
each term were cases dealing with criminal justice issues.63  Although 
judicial scholars tend to focus on the Court’s rulings dealing with broad, 
constitutional principles, we find that the Court handed down almost as 
many statutory decisions during this time frame as constitutional ones.  
From 1995-2005, the Court decided 151 criminal justice cases primarily 
raising a constitutional issue and 130 cases raising a nonconstitutional 
(statutory or other) issue.64  Despite the image of the Court as the 
ultimate protectors of constitutional rights, in the last decade the 
Supreme Court has heard only a relatively modest number of criminal 
justice constitutional cases.  Among these constitutional cases, we find 
that the Court was most likely to choose and decide Fourth Amendment 
cases between 1995-2005.  Among statutory issues, the Court was most 
active in cases involving habeas corpus relief. This emphasis, as 
discussed later, is not surprising given the efforts by Justice Rehnquist to 
lead the Court in a direction that would limit opportunities for convicted 
 
 58. In the Court of interest here, the conservatives are Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, 
and O’Connor, while the liberals are Ginsburg, Breyer, Stevens, and Souter. 
 59. See JOHN A. FLITER, PRISONERS’ RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND EVOLVING 
STANDARDS OF DECENCY 183 (2001).  While a conservative, Burger is most likely included in this 
quote because he led a fractured Court that produce some famous, liberal decisions. 
 60. Regarding the analysis and discussion of case distribution by vote, see infra note 66 and 
Table 1, we code those criminal justice cases previously identified.  See Smith, supra note 20, at 
161.  Then, we update that analysis for the final years under review here from 2000-2005. 
 61. Criminal justice-related cases are broadly defined for the purposes of this analysis, 
including cases concerning statutory and constitutional interpretations of laws and cases dealing 
with civil rights litigation affecting individuals working in the criminal justice system.  Each case 
outcome is then classified as liberal or conservative. 
 62. For related analyses, see Smith, supra note 20, at 161. 
 63. See id. (explaining why the Court takes and decides such a large number of criminal 
justice cases in any given year). 
 64. The ratio of cases raising constitutional to nonconstitutional issues varies considerably 
from term to term.  Christopher E. Smith, Michael McCall, & Madhavi McCall, Criminal Justice 
and the 2003-2004 United States Supreme Court Term, 35 N.M. L. REV.123, 128-130 (2005). 
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offenders to use the federal judiciary to challenge their convictions.65 
Second, consistent with conventional wisdom, we find that indeed 
Rehnquist’s Court generated a large number of conservative decisions.  
As depicted in Table 1, the Court handed down considerably more 
conservative decisions in this time frame than it did liberal ones. 
 
TABLE 1 
Case Distribution by Vote and Liberal-Conservative Outcome in 
U. S. Supreme Court Criminal Justice Decisions, 1995-2005      
 
Vote66 Liberal Conservative     Total 
9-to-0 and 8-to-1 decisions             47                 78                    125 
7-to-2 decisions                              15                 22                      37 
6-to-3 and 5-to-4 decisions             47                 72                    119 
Total                                     109 (38.8%)    172 (61.2%)          281 
Such figures strongly justify the Court’s reputation for ruling in a 
conservative manner.  The Court ruled against the interest of the accused 
in more than three of every five criminal justice cases it decided since 
1995.  However, the Court also handed down a significant number of 
liberal decisions.  Indeed, 38% of the cases that were either unanimous 
or had only one dissenter were decided in a liberal manner (47 of 125 
cases).  Moreover, of those closely divided and heavily contested cases 
with either three or four dissenters, the Court also rendered liberal 
decisions nearly 40% of the time (47 of 119 cases).67  While the 
conservative tendencies of the Court remain unmistakable, it is not the 
case that the Court only handed down liberal decisions in relatively 
 
       65.  See infra Section IV(D) (discussing the Rehnquist Court’s habeas corpus jurisprudence). 
       66.  Because Chief Rehnquist did not participate in some cases in the 2004-2005 Term, some 
categories include decisions with the indicated number of dissents but one less in the majority.  For 
instance, a 7-to-1 vote would be included with 8-to-1 cases for purposes of the table. See also 
Smith, supra note 20 at 170 (detailing comparable statistics for the 1995 through 2000 term of the 
Supreme Court). 
 67. In the most recent terms, this figure is higher still.  Combining the 2003-2004 and 2004-
2005 Terms, the Court delivered 32 criminal justice decisions with either 3 or 4 dissenters each.  
Half of these cases were decided with a conservative opinion, while in the other 16 cases the 
Court’s opinion is categorized as liberal. 
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controversy-free cases. 
Given the presence of four justices on this Court widely believed to 
hold a liberal orientation (Justices Breyer, Souter, Stevens and 
Ginsburg), it is obvious that to produce a liberal majority one of the 
conservative justices must provide a swing vote to the liberal bloc.  
Interestingly, especially given the emphasis of this paper, those liberal 
swing votes have been provided by all members of the conservative bloc 
except Chief Justice Rehnquist.68  In thirteen 5-to-4 criminal justice 
cases from 1995-2000 with a liberal outcome, Justice O’Connor 
provided a liberal vote in four cases, Justice Kennedy provided a liberal 
vote in four cases, Justice Scalia provided a liberal vote in four cases and 
Justice Thomas provided a liberal vote in five cases.69  Our updated 
analysis shows that this unique characteristic of Rehnquist continues for 
all ten terms under consideration here.  While Justices O’Connor and 
Kennedy are often considered to be potential swing voters, the fact that 
even Justices Thomas and Scalia could be counted as having provided 
liberal votes in such divided cases but Justice Rehnquist could not is 
noteworthy.  This is especially interesting given that Justices Scalia, 
Thomas and Rehnquist supported liberal claims in criminal justice cases 
at fairly similar rates.70  Examining votes in all criminal justice cases71 
decided (1995 Term through the 2005 Term), Rehnquist voted 
conservatively 75.2% of the time—slightly more often than Thomas 
(74.4%) and Scalia (71.5%).72  This ranking of conservative tendencies 
is rather consistent across the period.73  Overall, the Court’s voting 
patterns in criminal justice cases from 1995-2005 indicate that, while the 
Court tended to render conservative decisions, the justices also handed 
down liberal decisions.74  However, in the most contested liberal 
 
 68. See Smith, supra note 20. 
 69. These votes do not add up to 13 because in some cases, a “liberal” justice voted 
conservative.  A liberal decision in such cases required more than one conservative justice to vote in 
a liberal direction. 
 70. Smith, supra note 20 at 171. 
 71. Because Chief Justice Rehnquist did not participate in certain criminal justice cases 
during the 2004-2005 Term, his total number of criminal justice cases (274) is slightly lower than 
the 281 votes cast by both Scalia and Thomas. 
 72.   Smith, supra note 20 at 170.  Smith’s results were updated by the authors for  the Court’s 
most recent term. 
 73. For example, Smith finds that Justice Rehnquist supported liberal claims in 26.1% of 
criminal justice cases between 1995-2000; Justice Thomas supported liberal claims in 27.9% of 
criminal cases; and Justice Scalia supported liberal claims in 30.9% of criminal cases.  Smith, supra 
note 20.  Stevens ruled liberal in 69% of these cases - more often than any other Justice, followed by 
Ginsburg.  Id. at 171.  
 74. See Table 1 supra. 
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decisions, Rehnquist did not play the critical swing role that other 
conservative justices did.75 
IV.  SUPREME COURT OPINIONS WRITTEN BY JUSTICE REHNQUIST 
A.  Fourth Amendment Protection From Illegal Search and Seizure 
Given the frequency of Fourth Amendment cases before the Court 
in recent decades76 and in most terms,77 Rehnquist had numerous 
opportunities to affect the proscribed limits on police behavior.  In many 
of these instances, as both Chief Justice and as an Associate Justice, 
Rehnquist actively restricted the reach of the Fourth Amendment 
protection from illegal search and seizure and created exceptions to the 
Exclusionary Rule.78  While it is not surprising given his ideological 
tendencies that he ruled conservatively in most Fourth Amendment 
cases, it is interesting to note that in recent years, Rehnquist was unable 
to bring along the rest of the conservatives in certain significant cases.79  
As some Court observers note, while Rehnquist voted the majority in all 
but five Fourth Amendment cases heard by the recent natural court 
(1994-2004), four of those cases the Court were sharply divided and 
handed down liberal decisions.80  Chief Justice Rehnquist cast dissenting 
votes in each of these four cases.81  Some report that Rehnquist had 
moved so far to the right82 in recent years that his influence on the 
 
 75.  Information compiled by authors and, for all Court terms except the cases litigated during 
the 2004-2005 Term, verified through data found in SMITH, MCCALL & MCCLUSKEY, 2005, supra 
note 22, at 29; and  Smith, McCall and McCall 2005, supra note 64, at 151-159.  
 76. See Smith, supra note 20, at 166 (noting the extent to which the Court hears search and 
seizure cases, and why the Court is inclined to rule in this area). 
 77. Of recent terms, the 2002-2003 Term is somewhat unusual for the absence of a Supreme 
Court decision on a major search and seizure issue.  See Smith & McCall, Criminal Justice and the 
2002-2003 United States Supreme Court Term, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 859 (2004). 
 78. See Paula C. Arledge & Edward V. Heck, Votes and Opinions in Fourth Amendment 
Cases, 1994-2004: Is it Rehnquist’s Court?, Paper prepared for the Southwestern Political Science 
Association Annual Meetings, New Orleans, Louisiana (Mar. 23-26, 2005) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with authors).  Note that this study includes the first term of the natural court but 
does not include data regarding the Court’s last term.  Our update reveals that Rehnquist continued 
to be absent from a 5-4 liberal majority in 2004-2005. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.  
 81. The cases are Indianapolis v. Edmund, 531 U.S. 32 (2000); Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); and Groh v. Ramirez, 
540 U.S. 551 (2004). 
 82. Of course, it is possible that Rehnquist did not “move to the right” but rather that others, 
such as Justice O’Connor, moved to the left.  See, e.g., Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn, & Lee 
Epstein, A Multidisciplinary Exploration: The Median Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court, 83 N.C. 
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moderate conservatives had waned.83  In this section and in part to assess 
his influence, we review some of the major Fourth Amendment cases 
written by Justice Rehnquist over his career.84 
1.  Decisions Written While Associate Justice 
Very early in Rehnquist’s career on the High Court,  Justice 
Rehnquist handed down a Fourth Amendment opinion that would 
predict fairly well his views on the Fourth Amendment for the rest of his 
career.  In United States v. Robinson (1973),85 a six-member Court 
majority concluded that a warrantless search incident to a lawful, 
custodial arrest and consistent with established department policy did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.86 Rehnquist 
held that even absent concern for personal safety, and officer could 
conduct a full search of the individual pursuant to a lawful arrest, 
including traffic arrests.87  Rehnquist noted that police were not bound 
by the stop-and-frisk standards used when the police stop merely an 
individual for investigative purposes.88  The arrest itself established the 
officer’s authority to search the defendant, discovering the heroin 
concealed in his pocket. Consequently, the Court created an exception to 
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment for a search incident 
to a lawful, custodial arrest.89   
In a companion case, Gustafson v. Florida,90 Rehnquist and the 
majority extended the logic of Robinson to cases where there was no 
 
L. REV. 1275 (2005).  Of importance is the apparent gap between Rehnquist and other conservatives 
on the Court and how this gap seemed to widen in recent years. 
 83. See Greenhouse, supra note 8. 
 84. Beyond those cases covered here, Rehnquist also authored Fourth Amendment opinions in 
New York v. P.J. Video, 475 U.S. 868 (1986); Immigration and Naturalization Service et al. v. 
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez et al., 462 U.S. 579 (1983); 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); California Bankers Association v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 
(1974); Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430 (1974); Scott et al. V. United States, 436 U.S. 128 
(1978); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); 
Ornelas and Ornelas-Ledesma v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) and United States v. Hernan 
Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (1998). 
 85. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 86. Id. at 236-37.  Defendant Robinson was under a lawful, custodial arrest when the arresting 
officer conducted a full search of Robinson’s person and found heroin capsules in his coat pocket.  
Id. at 221.  The officer did not indicate that he was conducting a safety search and did not indicate 
any belief that Robinson was carrying a weapon.  Id. at 222. 
 87. Id. at 224. 
 88. Id. at 227. 
 89. Id. at 225. 
 90. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973). 
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existing department policy regarding searches pursuant to an arrest.91  
The rulings indicate Rehnquist’s proclivity to reduce limits on police 
authority. Although he would not further the reach of Robinson several 
years later to warrantless searches of cars pursuant to an arrest in 
Knowles v. Iowa,92 Robinson is an early indication of Rehnquist’s 
conservative philosophies that continued throughout his career. 
Shortly following the decision in Robinson, Rehnquist again 
displayed his preference for reducing limits on police activity in his 
majority opinion in Adams v. Williams (1972).93  The Supreme Court 
upheld the validity of this informant—prompted search despite the 
dissenters asserting that the state had not shown a sufficient cause to 
justify the stop in the first place.94  Rehnquist’s majority opinion instead 
held that the informant’s tip was sufficiently reliable to justify the stop, 
that the officer’s subsequent actions were justifiable to ensure his safety, 
and that probable cause existed for the arrest.95  Interestingly, Rehnquist 
would also write the Court’s opinion in Illinois v. Gates96 several years 
later in which the Court articulated a “totality of circumstances” 
argument that increased police flexibility in the use of tips.97 
Rehnquist’s preference for expanding police discretion and limiting 
the reach of the exclusionary rule is further evident in United States v. 
Peltier (1975).98  Peltier appealed for the exclusion of the marijuana 
found in his vehicle because the officers did not have probable cause to 
stop him.99  While Peltier was pending, the Supreme Court held in 
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States (1973)100 that warrantless searches of 
vehicles conducted near the border without probable cause were 
unconstitutional.101  Rehnquist concluded that Almeida-Sanchez would 
 
 91. See id. 
 92. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998). 
 93. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).  Based on a tip by a person familiar to a police 
officer, the officer approached a parked car and uncovered a loaded gun upon reaching inside the 
open window.  Id. at 148-49.  The officer arrested Williams for carrying a concealed a weapon, even 
though the weapon had not been visible from outside the car. 
 94. See id. (upholding validity of a search). 
 95. Id. at 148. 
 96. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1982). 
 97. See infra notes 143-147 and accompanying text (discussing in detail this “totality of the 
circumstances” standard). 
 98. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).  The border patrol stopped Peltier and 
searched his vehicle. Id. at 532.  During the search, border patrol agents found hundreds of pounds 
of marijuana. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). 
 101. Rehnquist dissented from the majority holding in Almeida-Sanchez. Id. at 287-99 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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not be applied retroactively to Peltier’s appeal because the agents were 
acting in accordance with then—current federal statutes.102  The purpose 
of the exclusionary rule as Rehnquist interpreted it—to discourage 
unlawful police conduct—did not apply here because the police, to the 
best of their knowledge, had acted lawfully.103  Consistent with most of 
his exclusionary rule decisions, Rehnquist found that the provision is 
necessary if the police have acted improperly, but not if a defendant’s 
constitutional rights have been violated in the absence of police 
misconduct.104  That is, it is not the violation of a person’s constitutional 
rights that triggers the exclusionary rule, but rather the police activity 
that leads to the constitutional violation.105  This police activity can be 
misconduct or the result of a lack of explicit department procedures 
regulating police activity.106 Indeed, Rehnquist’s majority opinion in 
United States v. Ceccolini (1977)107 supports this conclusion.  In 
Ceccolini, the Court concluded that illegally obtained evidence was 
admissible during a defendant’s perjury trial in part because the 
application of the exclusionary rule would not deter police behavior.108 
Further indication of Rehnquist’s predilection to allow greater 
police discretion is evident in United States v. Santana (1976).109  In 
Santana, the police attempted a warrantless arrest of defendant Santana 
because they had probable cause to believe that she had committed a 
drug offense.110  Santana moved to have the drugs and money that police 
found in a search of her home suppressed as evidence.111  Writing for the 
majority, Rehnquist found that because probable cause existed to make a 
warrantless arrest and because Santana was in a public place–the 
doorway of her residence–when the police first attempted to arrest her, 
the police did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they made the 
warrantless search in her home.112  Moreover, although the actual arrest 
and subsequent search occurred in Santana’s home, a private place, the 
 
 102. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 532, 537. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 537-38. 
 105. Id. at 539. 
 106. Compare Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) with Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 
(1990). 
 107. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1977). 
 108. Id. at 280. 
 109. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976). 
 110. Id. at 39-40.  Santana stood in the doorway of her home and, upon police confrontation, 
retreated to inside the vestibule of her home.  Id. at 40.  The police followed and seized money and 
drugs that Santana was carrying. Id. at 41. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 43. 
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police were in “hot pursuit” and thus could enter her home to make the 
arrest without a warrant.113  As such, the arrest and search were legal 
under the Fourth Amendment, justified ultimately because the police 
were in “hot pursuit.” 
In 1977, Rehnquist and the majority allowed the warrantless search 
of international mail in United States v. Ramsey (1977).114  In Ramsey, a 
U.S. customs official opened suspicious envelopes originating in 
Thailand without a warrant and found heroine.115  Some of the 
individuals connected to the mail were apprehended, prosecuted, and 
convicted for drug offenses.116  A U.S. Appeals Court suppressed the 
evidence and reversed the convictions, arguing that the Fourth 
Amendment did not allow the search of international mail without 
probable cause and without a search warrant.117  Rehnquist reversed, 
holding principally that the search of international mail fell under the 
border exception to the Fourth Amendment and thus searches absent 
probable cause or a warrant were nevertheless constitutional.118  The 
search was also legal under U.S. laws governing the conduct of customs 
officials that authorize an official to act on reasonable suspicion of 
illegal activity.119 
In addition to limiting the scope of the exclusionary rule and 
favoring increases in police discretion, Justice Rehnquist’s decisions 
also tend to reveal a preference for limited privacy rights under the 
Fourth Amendment.  For instance, Rehnquist’s opinion in United States 
v. Knotts (1982) 120 found that law enforcement officials do not violate 
individuals’ constitutional rights when they plant radio transmitters in 
containers and track the movements of those containers.121 In Knotts, 
Government officials placed radio transmitters inside a chloroform 
container.122  When the container was purchased, law enforcement 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977).  Rehnquist also found that reasonable 
suspicion is sufficient to stop for investigatory purposes suspected couriers at airports in United 
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 115. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 609.  A United States custom official at a New York post office 
noticed eight bulky envelopes from Thailand addressed to Washington D.C.  Id.  The official was 
aware that Thailand is a frequent source of illegal narcotics and the envelopes felt heavier than 
regular airmail. Id.   
 116. Id. at 610. 
 117. Id. at 611. 
 118. Id. at 617. 
 119. Id. at 614. 
 120. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1982). 
 121. Id. at 277. 
 122. Id. at 278. 
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followed the radio transmissions to a cabin and upon securing a search 
warrant, discovered a drug laboratory.123  The defendants sought to have 
the evidence suppressed, arguing that the government had violated their 
Fourth Amendment rights.124  The defendants asserted that they had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, and the warrantless monitoring of the 
chloroform container violated that privacy expectation.125  Rehnquist, 
writing for the majority, concluded that in fact the placement of 
monitoring devices in the container did not constitute a search, and 
therefore, Fourth Amendment protections did not apply.126  Moreover, 
the defendants did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy because 
the government surveillance resulted in nothing more than the police 
following a car on the public streets.127  There is no expectation of 
privacy that police will not observe a vehicle when traveling on public 
roads.128  The majority found no difference between visual surveillance 
and the police’s use of audio monitoring devices here.129  Clearly, Justice 
Rehnquist believed that individuals have no privacy expectation from 
government use ofelectronic surveillance130 to monitor the movement of 
items, at least in these circumstances and with this technology.131  Justice 
Rehnquist  authored an opinion in an earlier privacy ruling in 1980, 
holding that individuals have no expectation of privacy regarding their 
personal property in the purse of another individual.132  With the consent 
of the purse owner, a warrantless search did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.133 
 
 123. Id. at 279-80. 
 124. Id. at 279. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 284-85. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 285. 
 129. Id. at 284-85. 
 130. Rehnquist’s dissenting vote in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) shows similar 
logic, as he voted to find that the use of thermal imagers do not constitute a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment because individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the heat 
emanating from their home. The rulings in United States v. Knotts and much more recently in Kyllo 
are important indicators of his views on technological surveillance.  These decisions suggest that 
Rehnquist was quite willing to apply advanced technologies to the monitoring of criminal activities.  
Kyllo is one of five close Fourth Amendment cases ending in a liberal outcome and decided by the 
last Rehnquist natural court (1994-2005).  Rehnquist dissented in Kyllo and in each of the remaining 
four cases. 
 131. For more discussion on the application of the Fourth Amendment to technological 
advancements and the impact of technology on criminal justice, see SMITH, MCCALL & 
MCCLUSKEY 2005, supra note 22, at 12; Christopher E. Smith and Madhavi McCall, Constitutional 
Rights and Technological Innovations in Criminal Justice, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 103 (2002). 
 132. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-06 (1980). 
 133. Id. at 98. 
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As noted earlier, Rehnquist wrote the opinion in a major Fourth 
Amendment case, Illinois v. Gates (1983).134 This opinion articulated a 
new standard for determining the appropriateness of police use of an 
anonymous tip.135  Acting on an anonymous tip, the police chief, in 
concert with the Drug Enforcement Agency, arranged surveillance of the 
Gates as they made an alleged drug run.136 The police eventually 
obtained a search warrant for the Gates’ possession and found hundreds 
of pounds of drugs.137  The state appellate courts suppressed the 
evidence, holding that the anonymous tip did not pass the two-prong test 
established in Aguilar v. Texas (1964)138 and Spinelli v. United States 
(1969)139 for the use of information from an anonymous source.140 
The United States Supreme Court reversed, with Rehnquist 
concluding for the majority that the two-prong test established in 
Aguilar141 and Spinelli142 was unworkable and replacing it with a 
“totality of circumstances” test.143  In Aguilar and Spinelli, the High 
Court had determined that an anonymous tip was usable if the police 
could verify the informant’s “basis of knowledge” and if the informant 
could provide sufficient facts to establish the “veracity” or the 
“reliability” of the informant’s information.144  Rehnquist and the 
majority determined that the two-prong test was too restrictive and rigid 
and that it unnecessarily limited the police’s ability to apprehend 
criminals.145  By replacing this with a totality of circumstances test, the 
Court held that the officer is constitutionally able to use an anonymous 
tip if he or she finds that the sum total of the informant’s information is 
reliable, even if specific elements as required in Aguilar and Spinelli are 
 
 134. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1982). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 226. The case started in 1978 after the Bloomingdale (Illinois) Police Department 
received an anonymous tip asserting that Lance and Susan Gates were drug dealers.  Id. at 225.  The 
letter continued with a description of the Gates’ drug dealing activities, including where they 
obtained their drugs and how they transported those items.  Id.  The police chief then confirmed 
certain elements of the tip including that persons by the name of Gates resided at the stated address.  
Id. at 226.   
 137. Id. 
 138. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), overruled by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 
(1983). 
 139. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), overruled by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213 (1983). 
 140. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 227-29 (1983). 
 141. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 108. 
 142. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 410. 
 143. Gates, 462 U.S. at 231-32. 
 144. Id. at 232-34. 
 145. Id. at 233-38. 
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not present.146 The case represents another move by Rehnquist and the 
conservative majority to allow greater police discretion in the 
apprehension of criminals.  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s early views on the 
Fourth Amendment are clear: while search and seizure rights are 
protected by the Constitution, the protections should not deter 
“legitimate” police work.147 
2.  Decisions written while Chief Justice 
As Chief Justice, Rehnquist’s preference for increasing police 
power and discretion continues to be evident in several of his written 
opinions.  Indeed, a reading of these cases reveals that the Chief 
Justice’s personal preferences tend to fall on the far side of the 
conservative spectrum.  This pattern is so strong that, during the most 
recent natural court, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not provide the swing 
vote in a single criminal justice case much less a Fourth Amendment 
case.148  The four liberal members of this natural court–Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter, and Stevens–could rely on one of the other 
conservative justices (Thomas, Scalia, Kennedy, and O’Connor) to 
provide an occasional liberal vote to create a liberal majority decision.  
Only Chief Justice Rehnquist, during this natural court, failed to provide 
a single liberal vote in a close criminal justice case. 
We start the discussion of the Chief Justice’s Fourth Amendment 
cases with Colorado v. Bertine (1987),149 one of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s many car search opinions.  Bertine addressed the 
constitutionality of searching, without a warrant, a closed backpack 
during an inventory search of an impounded vehicle.150 Bertine argued 
that the court should suppress the narcotics found in his backpack 
 
 146. Id. at 237-38. 
 147. Rehnquist’s definition of legitimate police work tended to be broader than that envisioned 
by the earlier Warren Court. CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND CRIMINAL 
PUNISHMENT 7 (1997).  For example, six of the nine justices serving on the Warren Court in 1968 
decided in favor of individuals in at least seventy percent of criminal justice cases. Id. For some 
basic comparisons of case law and general tendencies of the two Courts, see OTIS H. STEPHENS & 
JOHN M. SCHEB II, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Chapter 10 (2nd ed. 1999). 
 148. Smith, supra note 20.  Smith’s data has been updated by the Authors to include the 
Supreme Court’s statistics through 2005. 
 149. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987). 
 150. Id. at 368. Police arrested Bertine for driving under the influence and impounded his van. 
Id.  During the course of an inventory search, the police opened a closed backpack and several other 
closed containers consistent with department policy requiring that they open closed containers and 
list the contents. Id. at 369-70. The police found drugs in the backpack and prosecuted Bertine on 
narcotics charges. Id. at 370. 
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because the warrantless inventory search violated the Fourth 
Amendment.151  Bertine contended that the police simply should have 
noted the closed backpack on the vehicle inventory.152  Rehnquist’s 
majority opinion held that reasonable police inventory procedures 
conducted in good faith satisfied the Fourth Amendment.153  Moreover, 
the majority noted that there was no evidence of bad faith or intention to 
investigate the backpack and the police had adhered to department 
policy.154  Again Chief Justice Rehnquist appears to discount the 
possibility of violations of individual rights provided there is no 
evidence of police misconduct. 
The ruling in Bertine turns on the fact that the police department 
had specific policies in place regulating the treatment of closed 
containers during an inventory search.  In contrast, the Court identified a 
Fourth Amendment violation in Florida v. Wells.155 Wells moved to 
suppress the evidence police found during a warrantess inventory search 
of his vehicle, and the Supreme Court agreed.156  Writing for the 
majority, Rehnquist found that because there was a lack of any policy 
regarding the treatment of closed containers during an inventory search 
of a car, the search was not sufficiently regulated to satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment.157  Again, the emphasis is on the regulation (or lack 
thereof) of police activity and not simply whether a search inherently 
violates the defendant’s rights.  Here, the lack of department procedures 
resulted in an unconstitutional search, suggesting that merely having 
police procedures in place might satisfy constitutional standards.  The 
fact that the search itself was conducted without a warrant is less 
relevant. 
The concentration on the reasonableness of police action is evident 
in the Court’s conservative decision in Ohio v. Robinette (1996).158  
Reviewing a consensual search of a stopped vehicle, the Ohio Supreme 
 
     151.    Id. at 369. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 376-77. 
 154. Id. at 372. 
 155. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990).  Police stopped Wells for speeding and after the 
officer smelled alcohol on the defendant’s breath, arrested Wells for driving under the influence. Id. 
at 2. Wells agreed to go with the trooper to the station for a Breathalyzer test and also allowed the 
trooper to open the trunk of the car.  Id.  The car was impounded. Id. During a warrantless inventory 
search, the trooper directed that a locked suitcase found in the trunk be forcefully opened, though no 
departmental policy compelled the trooper to take such action. Id. at 2-3. Police found a substantial 
quantity of marijuana in the suitcase.  Id. at 2.  
 156. Id. at 3. 
 157. Id. at 5. 
 158. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996). 
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Court overturned the related conviction, arguing that officers must 
inform suspects that they have a right to leave before conducting a 
search.159  The United States Supreme Court reversed with Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s majority opinion rejecting an absolute requirement that 
individuals be told they have a right to leave.160  The measure of 
importance was not whether or not a suspect knew he or she had a right 
to leave, but rather if the officer’s actions were reasonable.161  Similarly, 
the Court ruled in Arizona v. Evans (1995)162 that the Fourth 
Amendment did not require the suppression of evidence found when the 
police base their actions on a clerical mistake by court employees.163 
In yet another case dealing with the scope of police searches in the 
context of a traffic violation, the majority found in Florida v. Jimeno164 
that a police officer’s opening of a closed paper bag during a consent 
search of a defendant’s car did not violate the Fourth Amendment.165   
The defendant argued to suppress the evidence because, while he 
consented to a search of the car, he did not consent to a search of the 
closed bag.166  The High Court disagreed, finding the search permissible 
under the Fourth Amendment.167  Writing for the majority, Justice 
Rehnquist concluded that the defendant’s rights were not violated 
because he gave consent to search the car and reasonably should have 
expected the officer to look in containers that might contain drugs, 
especially after being told of the officer’s suspicions.168  Moreover, the 
officer was within his right to conclude that the consent to search had 
extended to the bag because narcotics generally are transported in some 
 
 159. Id. at 36.  An officer caught Robert Robinette driving 69 miles per hour in a 45 MPH 
zone. Id. Upon stopping Robinette and running his license, the officer found no citations or 
outstanding warrants.  Id.  The officer first issued a verbal warning, returned Robinette’s license, 
and then asked if Robinette had any illegal drugs or weapons in the car.  Id.  Robinette answered 
“no,” and the officer asked to conduct a search, to which Robinette agreed.  Id.   The officer found a 
small amount of narcotics, and Robinette eventually did not contest the charges and was found 
guilty.  Id.  
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 39-40. 
 162. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995). 
     163.    Id. 
 164. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991). 
 165. Id. at 249. Upon stopping defendant Jimeno for a traffic violation, the officer told Jimeno 
that the officer believed that Jimeno was carrying drugs and asked to search the car. Id. Jimeno 
agreed to a search of the car, and the officer found a closed paper bag on the floor of the car. Id.  
The officer opened the bag and found cocaine. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 249. 
 168. Id. at 252. 
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sort of container.169 
Rehnquist, of course, did not endorse unrestricted search discretion 
for police.  In Knowles v. Iowa (1998),170 Rehnquist and a unanimous 
court refused to extend the logic of his decision in United States v. 
Robinson (1973)171 to full car searches absent consent and an arrest 
warrant.172   In Knowles,173 Rehnquist held that a police officer could not 
conduct a full search of the car under the “search incident to arrest” 
exception because neither of the two historical justifications–the need to 
disarm a suspect in order to take the suspect into custody and the need to 
preserve evidence–existed in this case.174  The case is a rare instance in 
which Rehnquist wrote a relatively major liberal decision.175  Rehnquist 
and the unanimous Court were unwilling to allow police discretion to 
conduct full auto searches following mere traffic citations.176 
Rehnquist authored the majority opinion in another traffic-stop 
Fourth Amendment case, Maryland v. Pringle.177  The Court held that a 
police officer had probable cause to arrest all persons in a car in which 
drugs and money had been found.178  Individualized suspicion regarding 
which of the occupants owned the money and drugs was not 
necessary.179  Justice Rehnquist found that the police had probable cause 
to stop the car and to believe a crime had or was being committed.180  
Given this and the large quantity of narcotics and cash, it was reasonable 
for the officer to conclude that any or all of the car’s occupants knew of 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998). 
 171. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 172. See Knowles, 525 U.S. at 113.  In Robinson, the Chief Justice had concluded that searches 
of persons upon a custodial arrest were constitutionally permissible.  See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 218. 
 173. Here, an Iowa police officer issued a traffic citation to Knowles.  Knowles, 525 U.S. at 
114. Although the Iowa law allowed the officer to also arrest Knowles, he only gave Knowles a 
citation. Id.  Without probable cause and Knowles’ consent, the officer proceeded to conduct a full 
search of the car and found a bag of marijuana and a “pot pipe.” Id. 
 174. Id. at 116-17. 
 175. Id. at 113. 
 176. The only other liberal Fourth Amendment decision written by Rehnquist after becoming 
Chief Justice, and discussed later, is Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000). 
 177. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003). 
 178. Id. at 374. The defendant, Joseph Pringle, was riding in the backseat when the car he was 
in was pulled over for speeding during the early morning hours. Id. at 368.  The officer noticed a 
wad of money when the driver opened the glove compartment for the car’s registration. Id. The 
officer ordered a full search and found cocaine. Id. The officer then informed the individuals in the 
car that he would arrest all of them if no one admitted to owning the drugs; no one confessed, and 
all were arrested. Id. At the police station, and after waiving Miranda, Pringle confessed ownership 
of the narcotics but later asserted that police lacked probable cause to arrest him. Id. at 369. 
 179. Id. at 374. 
 180. Id. 
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the drugs.181  Thus, according to Rehnquist and the Court’s majority, the 
police had probable cause to believe Pringle himself had committed a 
crime.182 
In the 2003-2004 Term, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion 
in the car search case of Thornton v. United States (2004).183  The Court 
held that a police officer could search a car incident to a valid arrest even 
if the officer makes contact with the car’s occupant after the person has 
exited the car.184  Extending the logic of New York v. Belton,185 the 
majority held that search of the car under these conditions is still 
permissible under the Fourth Amendment.186  Rehnquist was persuaded 
that the officer was concerned for his safety and needed to preserve 
evidence, satisfying the historical criteria of the “search incident to a 
valid arrest” exception to the warrant requirement.187 While Rehnquist 
maintained that a traffic citation as precedent to a warrantless search in 
Knowles v. Iowa was unconstitutional, the arrest in Thornton preserved 
the warrantless search as constitutional. 
It is not our intent to minimize that distinction, yet it is difficult to 
reconcile fully the logic of the two cases.  If concern for officer safety 
and preservation of evidence are the principle justifications for an 
exception to the search warrant requirement, it should follow that when 
an individual remains in his car, arrested or not, and is arguably just as 
or more capable of harming an officer and destroying evidence than an 
individual who has left his car, the same warrant exception should apply.  
Despite this logic, Rehnquist and the majority in Thornton expressed 
concern that an individual who is not near his car may obtain weapons 
from the car or destroy evidence in the car justifying a full warrantless 
search of the car.  Lastly, in Maryland v. Wilson, the Court allowed 
police officers to order passengers to exit the vehicle during traffic stops 
until the completion of the search.188  
The possible access to weapons again in part prompted the Chief 
Justice’s opinion for the Court in Muehler v. Mena.189  Here, Mena 
 
 181. Id. at 373. 
 182. Id. at 374. 
 183. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004). 
 184. Id. at 619. 
 185. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). There the Court articulated the position that 
upon making a valid arrest of a car’s occupant a police officer may search the passenger 
compartment of the car. Id. at 462-63. 
 186. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 616. 
 187. Id. at 622- 24. 
 188. Maryland v. Pringle, 519 U.S. 408 (1997). 
 189. Muehler v. Mena, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005). In Muehler v. Mena, police officers obtained a 
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argued that his detention during the execution of a search warrant was 
unconstitutional.190 The officers’ presumption that weapons were on the 
premises was a factor in the Court’s rejection of Mena’s  Fourth 
Amendment claim.191 While no justice dissented, the concurring 
opinions expose the justices’ concerns regarding police tactics.192 
The Court handed down a number of rulings dealing with the 
constitutional limitations placed on customs officials and border patrol.  
As noted, before becoming Chief Justice, Rehnquist wrote the decision 
in United States v. Peltier (1975),193 which held that a court ruling 
requiring probable cause before a border search would not apply 
retroactively.194  As Associate Justice, he also authored the Court’s 
decision in United States v. Ramsey (1977)195 finding as constitutional 
the warrantless search of international mail by customs officials.196  Once 
Chief Justice, Rehnquist’s decisions regarding border stops and the 
activities of customs officials continued to limit the reach and scope of 
the Fourth Amendment.   
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s decisions appear to be more restrictive of Fourth 
Amendment rights.  In one post-September 11th case, United States v. 
Flores-Montano,197 the Court ruled that border patrol can 
constitutionally conduct routine searches even absent reasonable 
suspicion.198  Writing for the majority, Rehnquist found that a routine 
stop encompassed the removal and search of a gas tank.199 The 
defendant argued that the Fourth Amendment requires the presence 
reasonable suspicion for a border patrol search.200  Making note of the 
 
warrant to look for weapons and gang related material in the home where Iris Mena resided. Id. at 
1468. While executing the warrant, police handcuffed the residents and detained them in the garage; 
Mena was handcuffed for two to three hours. Id. at 1468-71. 
 190. Id. at 1470-71. 
 191. Id. at 1469. 
 192. See id. at 1472-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1473-77 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
Justice Kennedy expressed his worry that police might interpret this as encouraging the routine 
practice of handcuffing during searches.  See id. at 1472 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justices 
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer preferred that the lower courts determine the appropriateness 
of the length of time that Mena was handcuffed.  Id. at 1477 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 193. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975). See also supra notes 98-105 and 
accompanying text (examining this decision).   
 194. Id. at 542. 
 195. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977). 
 196. Id. at 624-25. 
 197. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004). 
 198. Id. at 155-56. 
 199. Id. at 155-56. 
 200. Id. at 151. 
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lower expectation of privacy at the borders, Rehnquist found most 
border searches to be constitutional.201  Consequently, the dismantling 
and reassembling of a gas tank in Flores-Montano did not constitute a 
significant deprivation of property.202  The Court and Rehnquist found 
that suspicion-less, routine searches at the border are constitutional.203 
Other cases support the assessment that Rehnquist regarded border 
searches to be less constitutionally protected than other types of 
searches.  In United States v. Arvizu (2002),204 Rehnquist and the 
majority upheld the reasonable suspicion requirement for investigatory 
stops and warrantless searches of vehicles at the borders, but held the 
reasonable suspicion may arise from the “totality of the 
circumstances.”205  The Ninth Circuit held that border patrol lacked 
reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and overturned the defendant’s 
conviction.206    Reversing the Ninth Circuit’s decision, 207 Rehnquist 
argued that the Ninth Circuit had erroneously considered the 
circumstances triggering the search as individual factors; examining all 
the circumstances together the High Court determined that the totality of 
the circumstances justified the search.208  The Court also found 
reasonable suspicion under a totality of circumstances approach to 
uphold the constitutionality of airport searches in United States v. 
Sokolow.209  Finally, in Unites States v. Verdugo-Urquidez (1990), Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion declined to apply the Fourth 
Amendment to searches of property owned by individuals who are not 
U.S. citizens and located in another country.210   
The Court again examined reasonable suspicion under a totality of 
circumstances analysis to uphold the search of the possessions of an 
individual on probation in United States v. Knights (2001). 211  Justice 
 
 201. Id. at 155-56. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002).  Here, the border patrol stopped Ralph 
Arvizu by the border patrol and found with substantial quantities of marijuana. Id. at 272. 
 205. Id. at 277-78. 
 206. Id. at 272-73. 
 207. Id. at 278. 
 208. Id. at 273-74. 
 209. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 210. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). However, the limitations 
discussed in Verdugo-Urquidez did not pertain to border patrol searches. Id.  
 211. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001).  Mark Knights had agreed, as a condition 
of probation, to submit to warrantless searches of his residence if officers had reasonable suspicion 
to believe Knights engaged in illegal activity. Id. at 114. During probation, Knights came under 
suspicion for vandalism, and consequently, the police searched his home without a warrant but 
27
McCall and McCall: The Criminal Law Jurisprudence of Chief Justice William Rehnquist
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006
MCCALL1.DOC 4/26/2006  1:04:15 PM 
350 AKRON LAW REVIEW [39:323 
Rehnquist’s majority opinion held the search in Knights to be 
constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment because 
reasonable suspicion balanced with the probation condition was 
sufficient to justify the police action.212 
The Court defined the privacy rights of individuals who are visiting 
another’s home in Minnesota v. Carter (1998);213 brief presence in 
another’s home does not create the same privacy expectations as would  
an overnight stay or residence.214 Although Rehnquist acknowledged 
that residents and overnight visitors of a home have some privacy 
expectations, he held that the defendants here did not have privacy 
expectations because they were present with the consent of the home’s 
resident.215  Moreover, because the men were involved in commercial 
activity, the Constitution reduced the level of privacy afforded to 
them.216  In short, Rehnquist and the majority concluded that temporary 
guests do not have the same privacy expectations as the homeowners.217 
We end this section with Bond v. United States (2000),218 perhaps 
the most surprising Rehnquist decision dealing with the Fourth 
Amendment.  The defendant here moved to have evidence suppressed 
arguing that the border patrol officer violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights during a routine bus search by “squeeze[ing] the soft luggage” 
without reasonable suspicion.219  That is, Bond claimed that the random, 
physical manipulation of luggage by agents without any individualized 
suspicion constituted an unreasonable search.220  Writing for the 
majority, Rehnquist agreed,221 handing down a surprisingly liberal 
ruling.  Rehnquist found that Bond had a reasonable expectation of 
 
supported by the probation agreement. Id. Upon finding bomb-making materials, the police arrested 
Knights, who subsequently moved to suppress the evidence. Id. at 115-16. 
 212. Id. at 121-22.  
 213. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998).  Here, a police officer looking through a gap in 
the window blinds observed Wayne Carter and Melvin Johns dividing up cocaine and placing the 
drugs into bags. Id. at 85. After their arrest, the defendants attempted to have the evidence against 
them suppressed, arguing that their Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. Id. at 86. 
 214. Id. at 91.   
 215. Id. at 89-91. 
 216. Id. at 90-91. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000). In Bond, U.S. Border Patrol boarded a 
Greyhound bus and squeezed soft (e.g., canvassed) luggage located in the overhead rack above the 
passengers. Id. at 336. In one duffle bag, the officer felt a brick-like object. Id. The owner of the 
duffle bag, Steven Bond, consented to a search of the bag in which the officer found 
methamphetamine. Id. 
 219. Id. at 335, 336-37. 
 220. Id. at 336. 
 221. Id. 
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privacy when he placed his luggage in the overhead rack, and thus, the 
officer had violated his Fourth Amendment rights.222  In the opinion, 
Rehnquist conceded that passengers who place luggage in an overhead 
compartment expect that others will touch and perhaps even move the 
luggage, but held that the officer’s physical manipulation of the luggage 
was more intrusive than simply moving the luggage and thus violated 
Bond’s right to privacy.223  Bond’s use of an opaque bag indicates that 
he did intend to keep the contents of his luggage private and expected 
that others would not feel his bag in an “exploratory” matter.224  The 
decision seems to run counter to most of the other outcomes chronicled 
here.  Others have noted that the Rehnquist Court “has placed the Fourth 
Amendment’s ban on unreasonable searches and seizures at the 
bottom”225 of its list of priorities.  Such an assessment holds here even in 
this limited analysis reaching only those Fourth Amendment opinions 
written by the Chief Justice.  Especially in the context of stops by Border 
Patrol, the Court and Rehnquist have repeatedly favored the ability of 
law enforcement to search without probable cause and have consistently 
identified reasonable suspicion based on a totality of the circumstances.  
The Bond outcome, then, is highly unusual and was unanticipated by 
many Court watchers.226 
B.  Fifth Amendment Right Against Self Incrimination 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Dickerson v. United 
States227 also surprised many228 by upholding the necessity for the police 
to inform suspects of their Miranda229 rights.  For most of his career, 
Rehnquist voted relatively consistently to increase law enforcement’s 
 
 222. Id. at 337-38. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 339. 
 225. CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN 
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 4 (3rd ed. 1993). 
 226. Christopher Smith, Criminal Justice and the 1999-2000 U.S. Supreme Court Term, 77 
N.D. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (2001). 
 227. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 228. As discussed infra, Dickerson involves the constitutionality of a congressional attempt to 
restore the case-by-case analysis of a confession’s voluntariness following the Court’s rejection of 
this approach with Miranda two years earlier.  See Greenhouse, supra note 16, at 251-52.  While 
this case stands out as contrary to most of Rehnquist’s decisions and votes regarding Miranda, the 
decision is consistent with Rehnquist’s view that Congress may not interpret the Constitution.  See 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517-21 (1997).  As such, the ruling in Dickerson may well 
be more about maintaining absolute judicial supremacy and less about upholding Miranda.  
Greenhouse, supra note 16, at 256. 
 229. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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ability to question and search suspects.  While a member of the Court, 
under both Chief Justice Burger and during his years as Chief Justice, 
Rehnquist contributed to the creation of numerous exceptions to 
Miranda rights such that some claim that Miranda rights now serve only 
as “hollow symbols” of prior Court doctrine.230 In this section, we 
chronicle Rehnquist’s major protection against self-incrimination 
opinions231 and in so doing, we further illustrate the uniqueness of 
Dickerson. 
1.  Decisions Written While Associate Justice 
Justice Rehnquist’s views on the importance of Miranda became 
fairly clear in a majority opinion he wrote very early in his career.232  In 
Michigan v. Tucker, police questioned a rape suspect after providing the 
suspect with an incomplete Miranda warning.233 On appeal, the 
defendant argued that his Fifth Amendment rights had been violated by 
the inclusion of the statements from an alibi witness idenitifed by the 
suspect during his questioning and, thus, these statements should be 
excluded.234  In an opinion written by Rehnquist, the High Court 
disagreed and upheld Tucker’s conviction.235  The Court ruled that, while 
the application of Miranda at the trial was appropriate, police conduct 
during the actual questioning did not violate Tucker’s self incrimination 
 
 230. DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 211-
12 (2nd ed. 1990). 
 231. To clarify, in this section we cover only Miranda rights and the Fifth Amendment right 
against self incrimination.  We do not, for instance, cover basic due process questions or questions 
regarding the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment.  Rehnquist has written a substantial 
number of opinions in double jeopardy cases.  See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978); 
Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985); Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317 (1984); 
Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982); Albernaz v. 
United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981); United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975), overruled by 
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); United 
States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378 (1992); and Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988). 
 232. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974).   
 233. Id. at 436. The case involved an indigent offender suspected of rape. Id. During police 
questioning and upon informing police that he did not want an attorney present, defendant Tucker 
answered several of the police’s questions and named an alibi witness. Id. at 436-37. Police 
informed Tucker that his answers could be used against him in a court of law, but police did not 
inform him that he was entitled to an attorney at trial even if he could not pay for one. Id. at 436. 
The alibi witness provided by Tucker contradicted his story, and police charged Tucker with rape. 
Id. The initial police questioning occurred before the Supreme Court decided Miranda v. Arizona, 
but his trial occurred post-Miranda. Id. at 437.  At trial, while the trial judge excluded Tucker’s own 
confession, he allowed the alibi witness to testify against Tucker and Tucker was found guilty. Id. 
 234. Id. at 437-39. 
 235. Id. at 452. 
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rights because the police only departed from the “prophylactic standards 
later laid down in Miranda to safeguard that privilege.”236  Therefore, 
the fruits of an interrogation absent Miranda need not be suppressed.237 
The decision in Tucker indicates an early attempt by Rehnquist and 
the majority to limit the reach of the Miranda ruling.  Perhaps the 
language and discussion of the reach and impact of Miranda are the 
most interesting aspects of the case and Rehnquist’s decision in Tucker.  
Rehnquist argued that Miranda did not establish any Constitutional rules 
and that the Constitution did not protect the warnings themselves.238  
Rather, the Miranda warnings were merely judicially constructed 
methods to guide the police during the interrogation process.239  
According to Rehnquist’s reading of Miranda, “these procedural 
safeguards were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but 
were instead measures to insure that the right against self-incrimination 
was protected.”240 
The second major case limiting the scope of Miranda written by 
Justice Rehnquist before his elevation to Chief comes in New York v. 
Quarles241 in 1984.  In New York v. Quarles, the Court articulated the 
“public safety” exception to Miranda.242  Recovering a gun from the 
location indicated by a rape suspect, the police arrested the suspect, and 
Mirandized him; after receiving the Miranda warnings, the defendant 
admitted ownership of the gun.243  Quarles argued at trial that because he 
made his original statement that the “gun was over there” without the 
benefit of Miranda and because the subsequent statement were tainted 
by the original statement, both statements should be excluded.244 The 
trial court agreed and excluded both statements in a ruling upheld by the 
New York Court of Appeals.245  The United States Supreme Court 
 
 236. Id. at 446. 
 237. Id. at 452. 
 238. Id. at 444. 
 239. Id. at 443. 
 240. Id. at 444. 
 241. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). 
 242. Id. at 655-56.  Here, a woman claiming to have just been raped approached police. Id. at 
651. One of the officers spotted Benjamin Quarles and because Quarles matched the description 
given by the alleged rape victim, the officer approached Quarles. Id. at 652. Quarles ran but was 
apprehended quickly by the officer. Id. When the officer frisked Quarles, he noted an empty gun 
holster and asked Quarles about the location of the gun. Id. Quarles replied, “The gun is over there” 
and pointed in the direction of the gun. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 652-53. 
 245. Id. at 653. 
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reversed.246 
In the opinion, Rehnquist created a “public safety” exception to 
Miranda.247  He noted that concern for the public safety must supersede 
the prophylactic rules established by Miranda.248  Rehnquist noted that 
police officers can distinguish between situations in which the Miranda 
rights can be read and those situations creating emergencies that must be 
addressed, and, thus, can be addressed, without the benefit of 
Miranda.249  In the case at hand, Rehnquist noted that the officers were 
reasonably concerned that the abandoned gun might have been used by 
an accomplice and thus the concern for the public safety was more vital 
than a reading of Miranda in these types of cases.250  Rehnquist seems to 
have viewed Miranda as a procedure that can be ignored or at least 
delayed based on circumstances and not as a broad, constitutional right 
that always warrants primacy.  Rehnquist stated in the opinion,  
[W]e conclude today that there are limited circumstances where the 
judicially imposed strictures of Miranda are inapplicable.  
. . .  
Today, we merely reject the only argument that the respondent has 
raised to support the exclusion of his statement, that the statement must 
be presumed compelled because of Officer Kraft’s failure to read him 
his Miranda warnings.251 
Rehnquist’s opinions in Tucker and Quarles illustrate his 
preference for limiting the scope of Miranda and/or the Fifth 
Amendment.  While these are two major ‘pre-Chief Justice’ cases, they 
are not his only decisions to expand law enforcement abilities under the 
Fifth Amendment.  For instance, specific to Miranda and writing for the 
majority, Rehnquist concluded in Wainwright v. Sykes252 that defendants 
may not claim for the first time in post-conviction proceedings that they 
had not understood the Miranda warnings.253  Rehnquist also wrote 
several opinions for cases dealing with interpretations of the self-
incrimination clause in general and repeatedly held for law enforcement 
 
 246. Id. at 659-60. 
 247. Id. at 655-56. 
 248. Id. at 653. 
 249. Id. at 655-56. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at 653 n.3 and 655 n.5. 
 252. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
 253. Id. at 84. 
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officials and for an interpretation that eased constitutional restrictions 
posed by the Fifth Amendment.  For a five-member majority in Allen v. 
Illinois,254 Rehnquist held that the testimony of psychiatrists made 
during a person’s involuntary commitment proceedings did not violate 
the Fifth Amendment.255  The case involved the confinement of sexual 
predators in Illinois.256  The High Court ruled that the proceedings were 
civil and not criminal and that the state’s purpose for commitment was 
treatment and not punishment.257  Thus, the privilege against self-
incrimination does not apply in civil confinement proceedings.258  
Similarly, in United States v. Ward,259 Rehnquist wrote that the use of 
reports to access monetary civil penalties does not violate the Fifth 
Amendment’s self-incrimination clause because the case did not involve 
a criminal prosecution.260  Finally, in United States v. Apfelbaum,261 
Rehnquist concluded that the Fifth Amendment does not prevent the use 
of statements made under immunity to a grand jury in a subsequent 
prosecution for providing false testimony to the grand jury.262  Again, 
the pattern is strong; in these cases Rehnquist limited the scope of the 
Fifth Amendment and increased the ability of law enforcement and 
judicial officers to arrest and convict suspected criminals.263 
2.  Decisions Written While Chief Justice 
As Chief Justice, Rehnquist’s commitment to limiting the 
applicability of the Fifth Amendment is equally clear in spite of his 
opinion in Dickerson v. U.S. 264 (detailed later).  A few months after 
becoming Chief Justice, Rehnquist wrote the opinion in Colorado v. 
Connelly.265  The majority ruled in Connelly that, absent evidence of 
police misconduct, a mentally ill person’s confession can be deemed 
 
 254. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986). 
 255. Id. at 372-73. 
 256. Id. at 365-66. 
 257. Id. at 373. 
 258. The dissenters note that the civil confinement and criminal prosecution procedures were 
virtually identical and that civil confinement was punitive, and therefore, the Fifth Amendment does 
apply.  Id. at 375-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 259. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980). 
 260. Id. at 248-49. 
 261. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1979). 
 262. Id. at 131. 
 263. Rehnquist also wrote the Court’s opinions in United States v. Valenzula-Bernal, 458 U.S. 
858 (1982), and Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972).  Both cases deal with the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments. 
 264. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 265. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). 
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voluntary.266 At trial a mentally ill defendant sought to have his initial 
statements suppressed.267  The psychiatrist who examined Connelly 
informed the trial court that, while Connelly was experiencing a 
psychotic breach, he was able to understand and waive his Miranda 
rights.268  However, the psychiatrist further testified that Connelly’s 
psychosis most likely motivated him to confess.269  Given this testimony, 
the court ruled that Connelly’s mental condition precluded his ability to 
voluntarily waive his Miranda rights and his statements were 
excluded.270 
Writing for the majority, Rehnquist reversed, noting that proof of 
police coercion is necessary to determine that a confession was not 
voluntary and that the mere taking of a statement from a defendant does 
not constitute a violation of due process.271  Arguing that the historical 
basis for excluding involuntary statements was to prohibit police 
misconduct, Rehnquist concluded that, “Absent police conduct casually 
related to the confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that any 
state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law.”272  
He goes on to note: “Only if we were to establish a brand new 
constitutional right—the right of a criminal defendant to confess to his 
crimes only when totally rational and properly motivated—could 
respondent’s present claim be sustained.”273  It is clear from Connelly 
that Rehnquist viewed the exclusionary rule as applied to the Fifth 
Amendment as only relevant when the police actively participate in 
getting the defendant to confess, and, it is rather limited absent a finding 
of police misconduct.  Police action does not lead necessarily to the 
exclusion of evidence.  Rather, Rehnquist states that, “Even where there 
is a causal connection between police misconduct and a defendant’s 
confession, it does not automatically follow that there has been a 
violation of the Due Process Clause.”274  This interpretation nearly 
parallels Rehnquist’s views on search and seizure protections.  
 
 266. Id. at 159.  
 267. Id. at 161. Francis Connelly approached a police officer in Denver and immediately began 
confessing to murder. Id. at 160. The morning after being taken to police headquarters and detailing 
several elements of the crime, Connelly claimed that “voices” in his head had made him confess.  
Id. at 161. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 162. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. at 171. 
 272. Id. at 164. 
 273. Id. at 166. 
 274. Id. at 164. 
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Regarding the Fourth Amendment, as noted supra, Rehnquist saw the 
exclusion of evidence as a measure to ensure proper police conduct 
rather than a constitutional right or guaranteed remedy. 
A series of cases in the 1980s and early 1990s further indicates 
Rehnquist’s preference for the expansion of police authority over civil 
liberties and individual rights.  For instance, in Connecticut v. Barrett,275 
the majority held that the Fifth Amendment allowed a defendant’s post-
Miranda statements asserting that he would speak about a crime, but not 
make a written statement outside the presence of an attorney.276  There, 
the state Supreme Court ruled that, by refusing to make a written 
statement, the defendant had invoked his right to an attorney.277  
Consequently, and although the defendant had agreed to make verbal 
statements without an attorney present, the statements were 
inadmissible.278  Rehnquist, in reversing, found that the defendant 
knowingly waived his right against self-incrimination and the police had 
simply honored the defendant’s intention to speak.279   
In Duckworth v. Eagan,280 Rehnquist and the majority held that 
police do not have to give the Miranda warnings exactly as stated in the 
Miranda decision.281  Instead, the Illinois police did not err when they 
informed a suspect that a lawyer would be appointed to him “if and 
when you go to court” even though this statement does not make it clear 
to defendants that they have a right to an attorney during questioning as 
well.282  Consistent with Rehnquist’s other statements regarding 
Miranda, he again noted that the warnings were nothing more than 
procedural safeguards.283   
Finally, in Brecht v. Abrahamson,284 the Court held, in another 
decision written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, that an individual’s silence 
post-Miranda can be used to impeach the defendant’s statements during 
trial.285  The High Court found the prosecution’s use of the defendant’s 
 
 275. Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987). 
 276. Id. at 530. 
 277. Id. at 526–27. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. at 530. 
 280. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989). 
 281. Id. at 200-01. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 202-03. 
 284. Brecht v. Gordon, 507 U.S. 619 (1992). 
 285. Id. at 639. The defendant, Todd Brecht, was accused of first-degree murder and made no 
statements to explain his actions during post-Miranda questioning, but claimed during the trial that 
the shooting was an accident. Id. at 624-25.  The prosecution noted on a number of occasions that 
the defendant had made no reference to this accident during pretrial statements, effectively arguing 
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silence as evidence of guilt error harmless and denied the defendant 
federal habeas relief.286 
The unmistakable pattern emerging from these cases and from 
several other votes by Rehnquist during his years on the Court is one of 
a consistently conservative posture when dealing with the rights of the 
criminally accused.  Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in 
Dickerson v. U.S.287 is both surprising and interesting.  Many observers 
did not predict the outcome in Dickerson.  One reporter recalls that she 
was convinced she had heard the Miranda rights for the last time when 
Rehnquist announced that he was handing down the Court’ s majority 
decision.288  Dickerson addressed a 1968 congressional attempt to limit 
the reach of the Miranda v. Arizona289 decision arrived at by the Warren 
Court two years earlier.  Following Miranda, Congress enacted 18 
U.S.C. § 3501,290 which mandated that, in federal criminal prosecutions, 
the admissibility of a suspect’s confession would turn on whether the 
confession was given voluntarily, considering the totality of the 
circumstances under which the suspect confessed.291  The federal law did 
not mandate any pre-interrogation, Miranda-type warnings and, thus, it 
effectively sought to overturn the Miranda ruling as applied to federal 
prosecutions.292   
In Dickerson, the defendant sought to have a statement he made to 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation suppressed because he had not been 
Mirandized.293  Reviewing Dickerson’s conviction for bank robbery, the 
District Court suppressed the statement; the Appeals Court reversed, 
arguing that because Miranda was not a constitutional holding, but 
rather a set of procedural guidelines aimed at directing police behavior, 
Congress could alter the reach of the ruling by statute.294 
In the Court’s strong 7-to-2 opinion, Rehnquist reversed the 
Appeals Court, invalidating Section 3501.295  Rehnquist began by noting 
that Miranda was a constitutional decision,296 a position contrary to 
 
that the defendant’s silence was evidence of his guilt. Id. at 625. 
 286. Id. at 639. 
 287. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 288. Greenhouse, supra note 16, at 251-52. 
 289. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 290. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968). 
 291. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432. 
 292. 18 USCS § 3501(1968). 
 293. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at 438. 
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many of his written statements regarding Miranda over the years.297    
Rehnquist held that Congress may not attempt to overturn the Court’s 
constitutional decision by mere statute.298  Rather, Congress may engage 
in legislative action to protect an individual’s right against coercive self-
incrimination, but in so doing it must guarantee that any legislative 
action be at least as effective in informing individuals of their rights as 
Miranda.  Congress essentially overturned the Miranda requirement 
through Section 3501 by allowing for voluntary confessions absent 
Miranda if the totality of the circumstances indicated that the person’s 
confession was voluntary.  The Court ruled the legislative end-run to 
circumvent the protections in federal court to be unconstitutional.299  
Dickerson appears to be another case in which Rehnquist felt a 
need to rein in Congress and to reassert judicial authority.  Perhaps his 
desire to protect the institutional security of the Court surpassed his 
possible desire to overturn Miranda.  Regardless, the presumed need to 
redefine Miranda lessened over time.  While Rehnquist had long 
disagreed with the Miranda decision, the protections it afforded had 
become so diluted by exceptions generated by both the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts that they no longer restricted police to the extent 
originally envisioned.  Rehnquist also pointed to stare decisis for not 
overturning Miranda itself.300  Acknowledging that while some members 
of the Court may question the wisdom of Miranda or would have 
decided it differently, Rehnquist asserted that the principle of stare 
decisis cautioned strongly against overturning it.301  Dickerson stands as 
the only major decision dealing with the Fifth Amendment written by 
Rehnquist that results in a liberal outcome, albeit based on motivations 
 
 297. Id. at 432.  One could fairly surmise from the cases cited previously that Rehnquist 
viewed the Miranda warnings simply as procedural devices used by police to help ensure the 
mandates of the Fifth Amendment had not been violated.  Thus, his initial statement that Miranda 
was a constitutional decision is surprising if considered alone, but not if evaluated in the context of 
the full opinion.   
 298. Id. at 437. 
 299. Rehnquist pointed to another recent Court case, City of Boerne v. Flores that intended to 
keep Congress in check. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517-21 (1997). Flores overruled 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Congress’ response to the Court’s decision in Employment 
Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  In order to provide a 
higher level of protection for religious freedoms, Congress passed the Act, lowering the standard of 
review for religious freedom from strict scrutiny to intermediate scrutiny. The Supreme Court 
rejected Congress’ attempt to legislate the Court’s standard of review in Flores, noting strongly that 
the Supreme Court had the right to “say what the law is.” Flores, 521 U.S. at 536 (quoting Marbury 
v. Madison, 1 Cranch at 177). 
 300. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443. 
 301. Id. 
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other than a singular desire to protect individual rights and liberties.302 
Although this discussion focuses on the actual opinions of Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, he also had considerable influence on other 
conservative members of the Court.303  While his impact is most clear in 
federalism cases,304 the Chief Justice’s conservative positions likely 
drive the Court’s general support of police policies and narrowing of 
individual rights.  Rehnquist’s influence over the moderate justices 
seems to have waned in his last few years, with his own philosophies at 
times too conservative to garner support from a majority of the Court.  
For example, during the 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 Terms collectively, 
Justice Rehnquist was in the majority in all eleven criminal justice 5-to-4 
decisions resulting in a conservative outcome but was in the minority in 
all nine of the 5-to-4 cases that ended in liberal decisions.305   
C.  Cases Limiting Congressional Control Over Criminal Justice Issues 
The revival of federalism cases, and especially outcomes favoring 
states’ rights, promises to be one of the major legacies of the Rehnquist 
Court and the leadership of Chief Justice Rehnquist.306  Because we only 
concentrate on criminal justice cases here, we will not chronicle all of 
the decisions that attempt to limit Congressional power, either through 
invalidating Congress’s use of the Commerce Clause or through 
 
 302. Rehnquist also wrote several other decisions dealing with the Fifth Amendment’s 
protection against self incrimination and due process clause.  See United States v. Robinson, 485 
U.S. 25 (1988); Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 
(1990); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 370 (1990); DeMore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 303. Judicial scholars commonly hold that a justice’s decision on how to vote is affected by his 
or her values, attitudes and the strategic choices the justice makes in attempts to persuade colleagues 
or to otherwise advance a particular interpretation or doctrine.  See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, 
THE CHOICE JUSTICES MAKE (1998). 
 304. Greenhouse, supra note 16, at 251-52. 
 305. See also Smith, McCall & McCall, supra note 64, at 123. 
 306. Political scientist Sue Davis writes that federalism is at the top of Rehnquist’s judicial 
values.  Davis writes: 
The federalism that Rehnquist places at the apex of his hierarchy of values entails a 
vision of the relationship between the federal government and the states that is 
fundamentally at odds with the view that prevailed on the Court from the late 1930s until 
the mid-1970s.  A commitment to shift power away from the federal government toward 
more extensive, independent authority for the states underlies Rehnquist’s decision 
making. . .Not only has he interpreted Congress’s enumerated power in a restricted way, 
but he has also maintained that even when Congress acts pursuant to its enumerated 
powers, it transgresses its constitutional limits when it infringes on state autonomy. 
SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION 149 (1989) (quoted in Greenhouse, supra 
note 16, at 259).  What is interesting to note here is that Professor Davis comes to this conclusion 
before recent, major federalism decisions like those in Lopez and Morrison. 
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application of the Tenth or Eleventh307 Amendments.308  In this section 
we analyze only those cases written by Rehnquist that limit 
congressional control in criminal justice cases. 
As previously discussed, Dickerson v. United States309 provides us 
with a good understanding of Rehnquist’s view of the role of Congress 
in relationship to the judiciary.  His views on the proper role of the 
national government in the federalism system as related strictly to 
criminal justice cases is evident in his opinions in U.S. v. Lopez (1995)310 
and U.S. v. Morrison (2000),311 and in his votes in U.S. v. Printz312 and 
Gonzales v. Raich (2005).313  Perhaps the most interesting of these is 
U.S. v. Lopez because the case marked the first time in fifty years that 
the Court asserted that Congress had exceeded its powers under the 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution.314 
Alfonso Lopez was a 12th-grade student when he knowingly 
brought a firearm to school.315  Lopez was charged with violating the 
Gun-Free School Zones Act316 of 1990, a federal statute making it a 
crime to carry a gun within 1000 feet of a school.317  Congress passed 
the statute under its powers to regulate interstate commerce.318  However, 
as the majority noted, Congress did not indicate in the legislative record 
how and why guns in schools affect interstate commerce.319  Writing for 
a five-member majority in what would be the first major case in a long 
line of 5-to-4 conservative federalism decisions,320 Rehnquist declared 
 
 307. For instance, Rehnquist writes for the majority in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 
517 U.S. 44 (1996). “Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making authority 
over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by 
private parties against unconsenting States.” Id. at 72. 
 308. Rehnquist’s dedication to the principle of states’ rights has been clear since the beginning 
of his years on the Court, and as Chief Justice, he was able to guide the Court through a period of 
time in which states won many of the federalism cases before the Bench.  See discussion in EPSTEIN 
& WALKER, supra note 3, at 319-447 (2004). 
 309. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 310. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 311. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 312. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 313. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005). 
 314. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549. 
 315. Id. at 551. 
 316. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1988). 
 317. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. 
 318. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A). 
 319. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552. 
 320. As suggested earlier, there are several interesting cases that indicate Rehnquist’s early 
commitment to states’ rights, articulated first in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 
(1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), and in his 
dissent in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), continues throughout 
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the Gun-Free School Zones Act unconstitutional because Congress 
exceeded its powers under the Interstate Commerce Clause.321  In the 
opinion Rehnquist held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act addresses 
criminal behaviors that are unrelated to either commerce or economic 
activity.322  Moreover, although, or perhaps, because Congress failed in 
its briefs to the Court to make any specific finding regarding what 
influence guns in school have on commerce,323 government attorneys 
orally argued that the cost of violent crimes was substantial, that violent 
crime might reduce individuals’ willingness to travel to areas perceived 
unsafe, and that guns at school would threaten the educational progress 
and create a less productive work force.324  Rehnquist found none of 
these arguments convincing, stating that, if Congress were allowed to 
regulate guns in schools, Congress would be able to “regulate not only 
all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime, 
regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce.”325  
Finally, in a rather harsh statement, Rehnquist wrote that, in order for the 
Supreme Court to find the Gun-Free School Zones Act constitutional, 
they would have to “pile inference upon inference in a manner that 
would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the commerce 
clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.”326  If 
the Court were to do this, Rehnquist warned, “there will never be a 
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.”327 
The case represents a substantial departure from a long line of 
Court doctrine stemming from the New Deal era and Wickard v. 
Filburn328 to uphold congressional action.329  The Court had for fifty 
years adopted a much lower standard that tended to defer to 
congressional judgment as to whether significant or substantial influence 
 
his career.  Most of the federalism cases decided post-Lopez are 5-to-4 conservative outcomes, with 
the majority consisting of Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and O’Connor and the minority 
consisting of Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter, and Stevens.  The Court’s recent decision in Gonzales v. 
Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005), varies considerably from the pattern. See infra notes 355-60 
(discussing this analysis in Gonzales). 
 321. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. at 553. 
 324. Id. at 563. 
 325. Id. at 564. 
 326. Id. at 567. 
 327. Id. at 567-68. 
 328. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 329. See Lee Epstein & Thomas Walker, Constitutional Law for a Changing America: 
Institutional Powers and Constraints, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY 319-447 (2004). 
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on commerce existed.330  As the dissenters noted, the ruling threatened 
legal doctrine that had seemed settled.331  While certainly Lopez came as 
a surprise to many Court observers, the ruling in Lopez is consistent with 
Rehnquist’s views of states’ rights first articulated in a majority opinion 
in National League of Cities v. Usery.332  When Garcia v. San Antonia 
Metropolitan Transit Authority333 overturned Usery nine years later, 
Rehnquist predicted correctly that his view of federalism and preference 
for state’s rights would “again command the support of a majority of this 
court.”334 
Initially, observers argued that perhaps Lopez represented an 
attempt by Rehnquist and the majority to chastise Congress for not 
articulating the link between commerce and their statutory activities,335 
and thus, when Congress properly explicated the rationale for the 
legislation, the Court would reverse course.  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
decision in U.S. v. Morrison (2000),336 would quickly dispel any belief 
that the principles articulated in Lopez were so limited.337 In Morrison, 
the Court reviewed the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 
(VAWA).338  Congress passed VAWA under its power to regulate 
 
 330. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 137. 
 331. Id. 
 332. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).  National League of Cities and Garcia are both 
decided on Tenth Amendment grounds and not commerce.  Nevertheless, Rehnquist’s views on the 
importance of states’ rights are clear. 
 333. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 334. Id. at 580. 
 335. EPSTEIN & WALKER 2004, supra note 3, at 453. 
 336. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 337. Although Morrison is not a criminal justice case, but rather concerns an attempt by 
Congress to allow for civil prosecutions of criminal actions, it is included here as an excellent 
example of Rehnquist’s decision making tendencies. While Rehnquist’s commitment to the 
principles of states’ rights is evident, Greenhouse notes that one of his major accomplishments is the 
molding of other Court members to his position.  See Greenhouse, supra note 16.  Greenhouse 
argues that by allowing others to write the opinions in federalism cases, Rehnquist served as a 
mentor, a role for which he often is not credited.  See id.  Because he tended to parcel out the 
authorship duties in federalism cases, he wrote the opinion in a limited number of such cases.  This 
underscores the importance of Morrison and further warrants the case’s inclusion here. 
 338. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598.  In the fall of 1994, Antonio Morrison and James Crawford 
allegedly raped Christy Brzonkala, then a student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute.  Id. at 602.  
Later, Brzonkala was unable to attend classes despite having sought professional help and withdrew 
from the university. Id. at 602-03. Brzonkala filed a complaint against both Morrison and Crawford 
under the university’s sexual assault policy. Id. at 603. The university found insufficient evidence 
against Crawford but found Morrison guilty and suspended him for two semesters. Id. Upon appeal, 
Morrison’s suspension was dropped and he returned to the university in the Fall of 1995. Id. at 603-
04.  Brzonkala dropped out of the university and filed a civil rights suit under the federal Violence 
Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b), against Morrison, Crawford and 
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interstate commerce,339 but unlike the situation in Lopez, Congress 
documented at length the relationship between interstate commerce and 
gender-motivated violence.340  The question for the Court in Morrison 
was the constitutionality of VAWA. 
Writing for the five-person majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist used 
the same logic he used in Lopez to invalidate the VAWA.341  Rehnquist 
stated that gender-motivated crimes are not economic and dismissed 
Congress’s documented evidence that these crimes can have a 
substantial effect on commerce.342  Rehnquist acknowledged that 
congressional studies present numerous reports that document the 
serious impact gender-motivated crime has on victims, but asserted that 
even these findings were not sufficient to uphold the legislation.343  
Rehnquist chose not to defer to congressional findings and charged that 
just because Congress said that gender-motivated violence is related to 
interstate commerce did not make it so.344  Rehnquist maintained that it 
is the Court’s responsibility to determine if certain activities have a 
substantial effect on commerce.345  Consistent with his views in Lopez, 
Rehnquist further wrote that if Congress were allowed to use the 
Interstate Commerce Clause to regulate gender-motivated violence,346 
Congress would be able to use the Commerce Clause to “completely 
obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national and local 
authority.”347  In Rehnquist’s views, upholding the VAWA would mean 
 
Virginia Tech.  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 604-05. The Violence Against Women Act stated that 
individuals have the right to be free of gender-motivated violent crimes and that victims of such 
crimes have the right to sue their attackers in federal civil court for monetary compensation. Id. at 
605. 
 339. Rehnquist also finds that the Violence Against Women Act is unconstitutional under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 627. 
 340. Id. at 614. 
 341. Id. at 606-08. 
 342. Id. at 608-09. 
 343. Id. at 614. 
 344. Clearly many in Congress have taken issue with such decisions, and some Senators have 
expressed these concerns while questioning John Roberts during his confirmation hearings.  For 
instance, referring to Morrison and other recent instances in which the Court declared acts of 
Congress unconstitutional, Senator Specter told Judge Roberts, “I take umbrage at what the court 
has said, and so do my colleagues.”  Linda Greenhouse, In Roberts Hearing, Specter Assails Court, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at A1. 
 345. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613. 
 346. Congress found that violence against women affects interstate commerce “by deterring 
potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate business, and 
from transacting with business, and in places involved in interstate commerce . . . . by diminishing 
national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and the 
demand for interstate products.”  Id. at 615. 
 347. Id. 
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that Congress could regulate any crime and violent activity even though 
the regulation of violence and crime is a state issue.348  Citing again the 
power of the judiciary to interpret the Constitution and to determine 
what the law is, Rehnquist clearly expressed his philosophical belief that 
Congress and congressional powers needed to be reined by a more 
supreme judiciary.349 
Finally, although not written by Rehnquist, the Court’s disposition 
of Printz v United States350 and Rehnquist’s vote in the case further 
reveal his states’ rights views.  Printz involved the constitutionality of 
the federal Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act.351  The Court, 
through an opinion by Justice Scalia and joined by Justice Rehnquist, 
overturned the provisions of the Brady Act which required states to 
implement federal law.352  Although the dissenters argued that the 
legislation was constitutionally based on provisions of the Interstate 
Commerce Clause, the majority disagreed and again limited 
congressional control over issues in criminal justice.353 
While, as some suggest, such cases might illustrate Rehnquist’s 
influence over other Court members and his willingness to allow 
colleagues to write major federalism decisions,354 the Chief Justice’s 
reach was limited at times. Gonzales v. Raich illustrates this 
limitation.355  Here, the Court upheld Congress’s power to regulate the 
production and use of medicinal marijuana under the Controlled 
Substance Act.356  Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held that 
Congress can regulate such production even if the production is intended 
for private consumption and consistent with the Court’s previous 
recognition of congressional power regarding the production of wheat.357  
Rehnquist was in the three-member minority which, through O’Connor’s 
 
 348. Id. at 613. 
 349. See Greenhouse, supra note 16. 
 350. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 351. 18 U.S.C § 922. The Brady Bill mandated national criminal background checks for 
handguns. Printz, 521 U.S. at 899-904. The law also required that until the national system of 
checks could be established fully, state officials would conduct the background checks. Id. at 899. 
 352. Id. at 935. 
 353. Id. 
 354. See Greenhouse, supra note 16. 
 355. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005). 
 356. See id. A federal (DEA) raid leading to the destruction of cannabis plants grown for 
personal consumption was valid despite a state law permitting the use of marijuana for medicinal 
purposes.  Id.  In 1996, California voters passed the Compassionate Use Act allowing ill 
Californians to use marijuana for medicinal purposes. Jeff McDonald, Supreme Court Decision 
Trumps California Law, THE SAN DIEGO TRIBUNE, June 7, 2005, at A1. 
 357. The case held to be controlling is Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
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dissenting opinion, asserting that the majority opinion violated the 
principles of federalism, was inconsistent with Lopez358 and Morrison,359 
and had not demonstrated that the activity (i.e., growing of marijuana for 
personal use) is economic in nature or that it has a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce.360 
D.  Cases Limiting Federal Habeas Corpus 
One of Justice Rehnquist’s lasting legacies will be his dedication to 
limiting the number of cases that qualify for federal habeas corpus 
review and relief.  Very early in his career, in an opinion dissenting from 
the decision to grant certiorari,361 Rehnquist clarified his view that the 
Supreme Court and other federal courts had allowed death row inmates 
to lengthen the appeals process improperly and prolong their stay on 
death row.  In a strongly worded opinion, Rehnquist noted that: 
I do not think that this Court can continue to evade some responsibility 
for this mockery of our criminal justice system . . . What troubles me is 
that this Court, by constantly tinkering with the principles laid down in 
the five death penalty cases decided in 1976, together with the natural 
reluctance of state and federal habeas judges to rule against an inmate 
on death row, had made it virtually impossible for States to enforce 
with reasonable promptness their constitutionally valid capital 
punishment statutes.362 
Supported by the appointment of other like-minded jurists (Justices 
O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, in particular)363 and through a series of 
cases over the next several years, Rehnquist and the conservative 
majority became very successful in severely limiting access to the 
federal courts for those seeking federal habeas review.364  Absent a few 
 
 358. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 359. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 654 (2000). 
 360. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2221 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 361. See Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 956 (1981) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 362. Id. at 958-59. 
 363. Early in his career Rehnquist, of course, lacked these supporting members.  For instance, 
just after joining the Court, Rehnquist (and others) dissented in the landmark death penalty case, 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).  Justices Brennan and Marshall, both in the majority in 
Furman, would continue to vote predominantly in favor of individuals’ claims in a range of issue 
areas until they left the Court in 1990 and 1991, respectively.  See, e.g., THOMAS R. HENSLEY, 
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH & JOYCE A. BAUGH, THE CHANGING SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 57, 61 (1997). 
 364. An early memorial review commemorating Rehnquist’s influence, for instance, recalls 
that Rehnquist “strengthened property rights and . . .[t]he Rehnquist court also made it harder for 
civil rights plaintiffs, prisoners and Death Row inmates to win claims in federal courts.”  Savage, 
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recent rulings dealing with the quality of justice meted out specifically 
by the Texas courts,365 the Court followed Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
lead.366 
One of the best examples of the extent to which Justice Rehnquist 
preferred to close off the federal courts to death penalty367 habeas 
appeals is Herrera v. Collins (1993).368  The case dealt with an 
individual convicted of the second-degree murder of two police 
officers.369  Following several years of review, the defendant filed for 
federal habeas relief on a claim of “actual innocence.”370  In his petition 
for review, the defendant supplied the Court with two affidavits by 
individuals who claimed that the defendant’s dead brother had confessed 
to committing the murders.371  The federal appeals court denied the 
petition for habeas relief arguing that the existence of new evidence 
related to the question of the defendant’s actual guilt was not grounds 
itself for federal review.372  On appeal, the United States Supreme Court 
agreed with the appeals court.373  Writing for the majority, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist stated that the refusal of the state courts to entertain claims of 
 
supra note 27. 
 365. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004); Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S.Ct. 2317 (2005).  See 
Smith, McCall & McCall, supra note 64 (discussing Tennard decision). 
 366. Habeas relief aside, in recent years Chief Justice Rehnquist was on the dissenting end of 
several high profile death penalty cases including Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2003), in which 
the Court held the imposition of the death penalty for the mentally retarded to be cruel and unusual 
punishment; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), in which the Court held that the imposition of 
death for juvenile offenders violated the Eighth Amendment; Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), 
in which the Court held that juries, not judges, must decide the aggravating factors necessary for 
imposition of the death penalty; and Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S.Ct. 2456 (2005), in which the Court 
ruled that the defendant in this particular case received ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 367. We do not cover Justice Rehnquist’s Eighth Amendment cases in this article, although he 
has written many.  Justice Rehnquist, for instance, authored opinions dealing with capital jury 
instructions.  See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000); Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 
(1998); Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990); Ross 
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987); and Wainwright v. 
Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985).  Although these are not the only cases dealing with the Eighth 
Amendment written by Justice Rehnquist, all of these cases deal with jury instructions in capital 
cases.  Last term, Chief Rehnquist wrote the Court’s opinion in Arthur Anderson v. United States, 
125 S.Ct. 2129 (2005).  See id.  While not involving a capital charge, the case involves jury 
instructions used to convict the Anderson account firm of wrongdoing as related to the downfall of 
energy giant Enron.  Rehnquist and the Court find that the trial judge erred in failing to convey to 
the jury criteria for determining guilt.  Id. 
 368. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
 369. Id. at 393-95. 
 370. Id. at 400. 
 371. Id. at 395-97. 
 372. Id. at 396-98. 
 373. Id. at 419. 
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actual innocence did not violate notions of fundamental fairness rooted 
in the traditions of the American criminal justice system.374  Rehnquist 
claimed that the ten years between the trial and the habeas petition 
reduced the defendant’s right to federal habeas review.375  Finally, 
according to the Chief Justice, the federal courts could not and should 
not force state courts to evaluate claims of actual innocence.376  The case 
illustrates Rehnquist’s beliefs that the appeals process for death row 
inmates was far too long and that the federal courts, where possible, 
should shorten the process of review. 
Herrera is only one of many cases written by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist that limited access to the federal courts or that placed limits 
on the extent of the federal hearings by the federal courts.  In the 2004-
2005 Term, for instance, the Chief wrote for a bare majority in Pace v. 
Diguglielmo.377 There the Court held that the petitioner filed for habeas 
relief beyond the statute of limitations and did not show due diligence in 
filing for state post-conviction relief,378 therefore time-barring federal 
habeas relief.379  In Hill v. Lockhart (1985),380 Rehnquist wrote that state 
prisoners are not entitled to evidentiary hearings regarding a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in federal habeas corpus proceedings.  
In Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,381 the majority held that improper remarks 
made by the prosecutor in a murder trial did not constitute cause for 
habeas relief.382  In Price v. Vincent,383 the Court held that an individual 
convicted of first-degree murder after his counsel had moved for a 
directed verdict was not entitled to federal relief based on a double 
jeopardy claim.384  The Court also restricted habeas relief in a major, 
early habeas petition case written by Justice O’Connor (Coleman v. 
Thompson).385  Rehnquist’s views on this point were so strong that he 
publicly lobbied to limit the extent of death row appeals in his 1997 
Year-End Report on the state of the federal judiciary.386  In part 
 
 374. Id. at 400-03. 
 375. Id. at 403. 
 376. Id. at 405. 
 377. Pace v. Diguglielmo, 125 S.Ct. 1807 (2005) (five-to-four decision). 
 378. Id. at 1810-11. 
 379. Id. at 1814. 
 380. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
 381. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974). 
 382. Id. 
 383. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634 (2003). 
 384. Id.  
 385. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). 
 386. See Judith Resnick, The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources of Alternative  
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reflecting these views, the Court has been very active in recent years in 
limiting federal habeas relief and shortening the death row appeals 
process.387 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As the longest serving member of his Court and as the Chief Justice 
for almost two decades, Chief Justice Rehnquist had a considerable 
amount of influence on the direction of the law and the outcome of 
Supreme Court decisions.  Rehnquist provided a strong and consistent 
voice in support of conservative ideologies and successfully marshaled 
Court majorities for these policy preferences in numerous instances.  
While his influence in federalism cases is perhaps the most notable, over 
time the standards from many of Rehnquist’s earlier dissenting opinions 
in criminal justice cases became the law.   
Early in his career, Rehnquist made arguments suggesting that the 
Supreme Court limit Miranda and exclude evidence only when police 
misconduct is clear.  Years later many Court decisions came to reflect 
this view.  The Supreme Court majority also implemented the Chief 
Justice’s preference for limiting access to the federal courts.  In general, 
while Rehnquist was unable to have his preferences prevail in many of 
the Court’s recent, most controversial decisions, his steady influence 
over criminal justice cases is evident.  The Court’s death penalty 
opinions regarding the execution of juvenile offenders and the mentally 
retarded stand out not only because they are liberal rulings on a 
conservative court but also because they are among only a handful of 
high profile criminal justice cases in which Rehnquist was in the 
minority. 
This brief review of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s decision—making 
tendencies also reveals an aspect of the Chief’s voting patterns during 
this latest natural court: he was unlikely to provide a fifth liberal vote to 
the four person liberal bloc.  While Justices Scalia, Thomas, O’Connor, 
and Kennedy all provided swing votes in criminal justice cases litigated 
before the Court since 1995, Justice Rehnquist did not do so a single 
time.  We find this pattern to be a very intriguing one, but we leave it to 
others to speculate as to the specific reasons for this pattern.  Here, we 
merely note that the liberal bloc was wholly unsuccessful in obtaining 
 
Texts, and Altered Aspirations, 82 GEO. L.J. 2589 (1998). 
 387. Other related cases include Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740 (1998), Stewart v. 
Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998), Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996), and Gilmore v. 
Taylor, 508 U.S. 333 (1993). 
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any support from Rehnquist in the closest of cases.  While many believe 
Justices Scalia and Thomas to be the Court’s more staunch 
conservatives, Rehnquist was the justice least likely to rule in a liberal 
manner in criminal justice cases decided since 1995. 
Throughout his career in the issue areas addressed in this analysis, 
Rehnquist may have been the quintessential “law and order” justice.  
This seems to be true at least in terms of how Republican presidential 
candidates first defined the “law and order” theme.388  Others followed 
Goldwater and Nixon in calling for policies that would more 
aggressively pursue and punish criminals, and for judges that would 
reduce the perceived constraints on police.  President Ronald Reagan 
blamed increasing crime rates on “years of liberal leniency” in the 
judiciary and elsewhere.389  The message continued, for instance, as 
1996 GOP presidential nominee Robert Dole frequently bemoaned that 
President William Clinton’s judicial appointees, in Dole’s opinion, were 
too eager to use technicalities to overturn the convictions of 
murderers.390  As some scholars have observed, such critiques of the 
judiciary became “rather standard election-year political fare.  Ever since 
Richard M. Nixon’s 1968 presidential campaign, Republican candidates 
have attacked Democrats for appointing judges who are ‘soft on 
criminals.’”391 
In this sense, the “law and order” label seems to befit Justice 
Rehnquist.  As examined here, Rehnquist repeatedly voted to weaken or 
rescind restrictions on police, to limit the scope of double jeopardy 
protections and to reduce the accessibility of the federal courts to 
prisoners seeking habeas corpus review and relief. 
The “get-tough” posture was only one of at least two main themes 
emerging in conservative presidential campaigns after the early 1960s.  
The rhetoric of Goldwater, Nixon, and others was characterized perhaps 
even more by the call for a “devolution” of federalism that would reduce 
federal and enhance state powers.392  Here, too, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s voting record conforms rather well to these early, electoral 
messages.  His commitment to shift criminal justice and other powers 
 
 388. See, e.g., SMITH, MCCALL &  MCCLUSKEY  2005, supra note 22. 
 389. David Hoffman, Reagan Stumps with Tough Line on Crime, Drunk Driving, 
WASHINGTON POST, June 21, 1984, at 7. 
 390. Michael Tackett, Dole Fires a Salvo at Clinton, Judges: GOP Hopeful Blames Jurists for 
Crime, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 20, 1996, at 1. 
 391. STEPHAN WAYNE, G. CALVIN MACKENZIE, DAVID M. O’BRIEN, & RICHARD L. COLE, 
THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 566 (2nd ed.1997). 
 392. See SMITH, MCCALL &  MCCLUSKEY  2005, supra note 22, at 45-55 (noting the attention 
that Goldwater and Nixon gave to these issue areas). 
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away from the federal government and to broaden the powers enjoyed 
by state governments is unmistakable.393  Perhaps Rehnquist writing the 
decision in Dickerson,394 that not only upheld the Miranda warnings but 
also labeled Miranda as a constitutional decision, is not as surprising as 
it might have seemed at the time.  Rehnquist’s motives easily could be 
viewed to include the desire to reaffirm judicial supremacy in 
interpreting constitutional requirements in light of a Congress that was 
perceived to be encroaching on the Court’s authority.  Similarly, while 
Rehnquist’s decision might have allowed for guns near schools395 or 
while his vote could have made it easier for felons to purchase guns,396 
his actions were hardly intended to primarily favor criminal defendants.  
Rather, the broader thrust of these and similar opinions as in Morrison397 
was to rein in perceived intrusions by Congress into a states’ area of 
influence. 
We found Chief Justice Rehnquist held consistently conservative 
viewpoints throughout his career in the issue areas addressed here and 
was relatively successful in implementing his policy preferences.  
Instances in which Rehnquist appears, at first blush, to have deviated 
from this course often fit the larger pattern upon closer scrutiny.  Thus, 
his vote in Dickerson is consistent with his views on congressional 
power within the realm of criminal justice.  Whether one agrees with the 
Chief Justice’s preferences or not, this analysis suggests that over the 
course of his career he saw many of his preferences enacted into law and 
reshaped judicial doctrine in several important areas of criminal justice.  
He leaves behind a potent legacy of conservative criminal justice 
decisions that in many ways marries the values of crime control and 
states’ rights and that almost assuredly will leave a long-lasting imprint 
on the Court. 
It is difficult to predict, at this point, whether Rehnquist’s legacy 
will be embodied directly by an heir on the Court.  While the 
jurisprudence of his successor, John Roberts,398 has been likened to that 
 
 393. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3, at 319-447 (2004); SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE 
REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989). 
 394. Dickerson v. United States 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000). 
 395. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 396. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 397. United States v. Morrison, 539 U.S. 654 (2000). 
 398. Roberts was approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee on September 22, 2005 by a 
vote of 13-5.  See Roberts Nomination Advances, CNN NEWS (Sept. 22, 2005), available at 
http://www.cnn.com.  He was then confirmed by the full Senate on Sept. 29, 2005 by a vote of 78-
22. See Roberts Confirmed as Chief Justice, CNN NEWS (Sept. 29, 2005), available at 
http://www.cnn.com. 
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of Rehnquist,399 - Roberts clerked for Rehnquist400 - and although in his 
confirmation hearings Roberts suggested that observers should not be 
surprised if they find his interpretations to be similar to those Rehnquist 
championed,401 Roberts also insisted before Senate that he was “his own 
man.”402  To date, Roberts’s views on federalism403 appear to 
approximate the opinions by Rehnquist favoring states’ rights, though 
less has been discussed during the confirmation hearings and elsewhere 
of Roberts’s specific interpretations of restrictions on law enforcement 
and other criminal justice issues.  While the consistency and quantity of 
Rehnquist’s opinions in criminal justice cases indicate that the influence 
of the late Chief Justice will continue to shape law in these areas, it is 
unclear for how long precisely this will be true.  The arrival of newly-
appointed Chief Justice Roberts and Associate Justice Samuel Alito at 
the retirement of Justice O’Connor, who frequently proved critical in 
determining whether Rehnquist would be in the Court’s majority or 
minority,404 require that the writing of Chief Justice William Hubbs 
Rehnquist’s legacy remains a work in progress. 
 
 399. For instance, Walter Dellinger, a former U.S. solicitor general, states, “It’s hard to 
imagine a choice more similar to Chief Justice Rehnquist than John Roberts.” Joan Biskupic, 
Roberts, Rehnquist compel comparisons, USA TODAY, Sept. 7, 2005, at 12A. 
 400. For a perspective outside the United States of the nomination, certain similarities between 
Rehnquist and Roberts, and Roberts’s credentials, see Bush Names Roberts Top US Judge, BBC 
NEWS (Sept. 5, 2005), available at http://www.news.bbc.co.uk. 
 401. Senate Confirmation Hearings on the Nomination of John Roberts to the Position of Chief 
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Washington Post (2005), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com.  See also Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Adam Liptak, Roberts Fields 
Questions on Privacy and Precedents, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005. 
 402. Stolberg & Liptak, supra note 399. 
 403. Most have held that little is yet known of Roberts’s views on a range of issues.  Jonathan 
Turley writes that “John Roberts may be the ultimate example of the judicial blind date.”  Jonathan 
Turley, Roberts: The Before and After, USA TODAY (Aug. 30, 2005), available at 
http://www.USATODAY.com.  That aside, Turley offers some brief insights into Roberts’s most 
likely leanings in the areas, among others, of federalism and criminal law and procedure.  Id. 
 404. Several assessments of the Court have noted the often centrist and critical role played by 
Justice O’Connor, especially in sharply divided cases.  Among the more recent scholarship, see 
SMITH, MCCALL &  MCCLUSKEY  2005, supra note 22, at 12; Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn 
& Lee Epstein, The Median Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275 (2005). 
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